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vVHEN Is A D OG'S TAIL NOT A LEG?: A PROPERTY-BASED 
M ETHODOLOGY FOR DISTINGUISHING SALES OF 
RECEIVABLES FROM SECURITY INTERESTS THAT SECURE AN 
OBLIGATION 
Steven L. Harris 
Charles W Jvfooney, Jr. * 
"How many legs does a dog have if you call the tail a leg? Four. 
Calling a tail a leg doesn 't make it a leg. " 
- Abraham Lincoln1 
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l. INTRODUCTION 
A finn that is owed money payable in the future may need the money 
now. There are two principal ways in which the firm might use its 
rights to payment (receivables) to accomplish that result: It might sell its 
* Harris is Professor of Law at liT Ch icago-Kent College of Law, and Mooney is the Charles 
A. Heimbold , Jr. Professor of Law at the U ni vers ity of Penn sylvan ia Law Sc hool. Un less 
contraindi cated. re ferences in the text to "section X-XXX" refer to sections of the Unifotm Commercial 
Code. This Artic le benefited from the helpful comments of Fel ice Balian, Kenneth Kettering, Th omas 
Plank, Ad rian Wa lters, and Steven Weise. 
l. Abmham Lincoln Quotes, GOODREADS , http ://www.goodreads.corn/quotes/8260-how-many-
legs-does-a-dog-have-i f-you-call (last visited Apr. 4, 2014) . One of Lincoln' s contemporaries 
rem ini sced about Lincoln making this observation wi th respect to a ca lf. George W. Julian , Lincoln and 
the Proclamation of Emancipation, in REMIN ISCENCES OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 227, 242 (Allen 
Thorndike Rice ed. , Harper & Bros. new & rev. ed. 1909). 
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receivables, or it might borrow and use the receivables as collateral to 
secure a loan. Either transaction creates a "security interest" under 
Uniform Commercial Code Article 9.2 However, different legal 
consequences follow depending on whether the transaction is a sale (or, 
as it commonly is called, a true sale) or is a security interest that secures 
an obligation (a SIS0).3 
These legal consequences are particularly salient when the firm enters 
bankruptcy. If the transaction is a sale, then the receivables do not 
become part of the firm's bankruptcy estate, and the buyer can collect 
them as if no bankruptcy had ensued.4 If, however, the transaction is a 
SISO, then the receivables do become property of the firm's bankruptcy 
estate.5 As such, they may be used by the firm during the bankruptcy 
and cannot be collected by the secured party unless the bankruptcy court 
orders otherwise.6 The bankruptcy consequences of the distinction 
between a true sale and a SISO form the cornerstone of securitization, or 
"structured finance ," transactions. In these transactions, a firm obtains 
needed cash by selling its receivables to an entity whose sole purpose is 
to buy the receivables and issue securities (often, publicly traded debt 
securities).7 The value of the securities depends solely on the value of 
the receivables. Unlike the firm's secured debt, the value of the 
securities issued by the buyer is not affected by the financial condition 
of the firm. 
If the firm enters bankruptcy, creditors have an incentive to argue that 
a transaction that is structured and documented as a true sale creates a 
SISO in substance and so should be treated as a SISO in the bankruptcy. 
Such a recharacterization poses a great risk to the holders of securities 
issued by the buyer in a securitization. Unless the bankruptcy court 
treats a securitization transaction as a true sale of the receivables, the 
2. "'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fi xtures which secures payment 
or performance of an obligation. 'Securi ty interest' includes any interest of a . .. buyer of accounts, 
chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9." 
U.C.C. § l-201(b)(3 5) (2008). Article 9 generally applies to transacti ons, regardless of their fonn, that 
create a security interest by contract, as well as to sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, 
and promissory notes. U.C.C. § 9- 109(a)( l ), (3) (2010). 
3. See infra Part III. SISOs also are known as "collateral ass ignments" and "transfers for 
security." 
4. See 11 U.S.C. § 54 l(a)( l) (20 12) (providing that the estate includes "all legal or equitable 
in terests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"). 
5. See id. More prec isely, the firm 's interest in the receivables becomes property of the 
bankruptcy estate. 
6. See id. § 363(c)( l )-(2) (providing that the trustee in bankruptcy genera ll y "may use property 
of the estate in the ordinary course of business" and specifying the conditi ons under whi ch the trustee 
may use cash collateral) ; id. § 362(a)(3) (prohibiting the taking of "any act to obtain possess ion of 
property of the estate ... or to exercise control over property of the estate"); id. § 362(a)(4) (prohibiting 
the taking of "any act to ... enforce any lien against property of the estate"). 
7. Typical securitization transactions are described in greater detail infra Part III. 
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transaction will not accomplish its intended purpose. If the court 
recharacterizes a purported sale as a SISO, the receivables will become 
property of the firm's bankruptcy estate, thereby reducing the value of 
the securities to the security holders. 8 
Because a true sale and a SISO share many attributes, both courts and 
scholars have found it difficult to distinguish between them in 
securitization and other complex transactions . Article 9 includes 
important prov1s10ns whose application depends on whether a 
transaction is a true sale or a SISO, yet the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) provides virtually no guidance for characterizing a transaction, 
leaving that task to the courts.9 The existing case law is confused and 
confusing, and the resulting uncertainty increases the costs (and thereby 
reduces the value) of securitizations. 1° Commentators have suggested a 
variety of approaches to characterization, but none has been wholly 
successnd. Most rely on a balancing of specific factors that by necessity 
results in uncertainty. 11 Professor Kenneth Kettering's approach, which 
would recharacterize a purported sale as a SISO only when necessary to 
promote the purpose of recharacterization, gives more guidance. But by 
ignoring the economic differences between the two transactions, it too 
falls short. 12 
We offer in this Article our own methodology for determining 
whether a purported true sale is a SISO. First, one must identify the 
specific allocation of rights between the purported buyer and seller and 
determine whether the seller has retained any meaningful economic 
interest in the receivables. Second, even if the seller has retained some 
economic interest in the receivables, one must determine whether that 
interest secures an obligation of the seller. The requisite obligation need 
8. A court that applies nonbankruptcy law to determine whether a purported sa le is a SfSO 
looks to the nature of the transaction at the time it is entered into. In that sense, the court 
'·characterizes," rather than "recharacterizes" the transaction. We refer to a court as " recharacter izing" 
to contrast the coun 's later characterization of the transaction with the parties' earlier characterizat ion. 
9. U.C.C. § 9- 109 cmts. 3, 4 (2010) . Article 9 does indicate, however, that a transaction may be 
a tme sale even if the buyer is entitled to charge back uncollected collateral or to full or li mited recourse 
aga inst the seller. See id. § 9-207(d)( I). On the relevance of recourse, see infra Part V.A- B. 
l 0. As one court exp lain ed: 
The extensive case law is almost no help .... 
The absence of any set legal analys is, along with the annoying tendency of decisions to tum on 
the ir facts, makes predict in g the outcome of a loan/tme sa le dispute nearly impossible. See 
Hearing on Bankntptcy Reform Act of 1999 (H.R. 833) (Statement of S. Grosshandler, Partner, 
Cleary, Gott li eb, Steen & Hami lton) (available at www.house.gov/judiciary/l 06- gros.htm) 
(observing that the legal ana lys is is "highly subj ective" and that issuing "true sale opin ions" in 
connection with some transactions is therefore "extremely ditlicu lt, costly, and in a few cases, 
impossible''). 
In re Commercial Loan Corp ., 316 B.R. 690,700-01 (Bankr. N.D. [II. 2004). 
11. See infra Part !V.B.l (discussing the principal approaches taken by commentators). 
12. See inji-a Part IV.B.2 (disc ussing Kettering's approach). 
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not be a binding contractual obligation. It may be implied when the 
terms of the transaction, as viewed from the outset, are such that, to 
avoid losing its interest in the receivables, the seller would be 
economically compelled to make a payment to the buyer. This property-
based approach builds on the analysis of the characterization issue by 
others and borrows directly from the existing learning, literature, case 
law, and codification concerning an analogous determination: whether a 
true lease of goods should be recharacterized as a SISO. By focusing on 
the essential attributes of a SISO, we provide a workable way in which 
to give effect to the policy underlying recharacterization. 13 
Because the true sale-SISO distinction is so crucial to securitization 
transactions, we focus on the distinction as it arises in that context. We 
begin in Part II with a brief description of a typical securitization 
transaction and a summary of various critiques and defenses of 
securitization presented in the legal literature. Part III explains what is 
at stake if a purported true sale is recharacterized outside bankruptcy. 
Part IV first reviews and criticizes the approach toward the 
recharacterization issue that characterizes the case law and then 
addresses the efforts at rationalizing the case law that others have taken. 
In Part V we develop our own methodology, which we illustrate with 
specific examples. 
II. OVERVIEW OF SECURITIZATION 
A securitization typically entails a sale of receivables by an originator 
to a separate entity, which sale is accompanied by the buying entity 's 
issuance of securities. 14 For commercial law and bankruptcy purposes, 
the core concept is that the originator has transferred ownership of the 
receivables to the buyer and no longer has any interest in them.15 The 
buyer in many cases will be a special purpose entity (SPE) fonned 
solely to participate in the securitization transaction and whose activities 
are limited to such participation. In many cases the SPE is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of the originator. 16 Funds received from the SPE's 
13. We offer our methodology fo r use in the commercial law and bankruptcy settings. The 
distinction between a tme sale and a SISO may affect a transaction 's tax and accou ntin g treatment; 
however, those settings may implicate diffe rent policies and so may dictate a different methodology. 
14. The fo llowing overview is based in large part on Kenneth C. Kettering, Securitizarion and Its 
Discontenrs: The Dynamics of Financial Product Development, 29 CARDOZO L. R EV. 1553, 1564--66 
(2008 ) [hereinafter Kettering, Discontents]. 
15. Some transactions (for accounting reasons) employ a " two-tier" stmcture in whi ch th e buyer 
transfers the receivables to a second buyer, whi ch then issues the securities and pays over the proceeds 
to the t! rst buyer. The key point for the securiti zat ion 's effectiveness is that the sa le to the fi rst buyer be 
a tme sale. 
16. The receivables typically woul d be of a value in excess of that needed to pay the debt 
sec urities issued by the SPE. The originator would indirectly retain the benefit of the excess value 
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issuance of securities are used to pay the originator the purchase price 
for the receivables. 17 Various arrangements attempt to ensure that the 
SPE will be "bankn1ptcy remote," i.e., that the SPE will not itself 
become subject to a bankruptcy proceeding and that, if the originator 
enters bankruptcy, the SPE and the originator will not be substantively 
consolidated and treated as a single entity. The goal is that a future 
bankruptcy of the originator will have no effect on the SPE' s right and 
ability to collect the receivables. 18 
To date, this goal has been achieved. During the past twenty-five 
years the volume of securitization transactions in the United States has 
grown exponentially. 19 A setback occurred in 2008, when new 
securitizations virtually came to a halt as a result of the financial crisis,20 
but the product has rebounded since then and can be expected to be an 
important method of financing in the future? 1 
Several legal scholars have criticized secuntlzation transactions on 
both doctrinal and normative grounds.22 The legal academic literature 
through its equity interest in the SPE. In an alternative structure, the originator sells the receivables to a 
trust that holds legal title for the benefit of the holders of pass-through certificates representing the 
beneficial interest in the receivables. See Thomas E. Plank, Sense and Sensibility in Securitization: A 
Prudent Legal Stntcture and a Fancifit! Critique, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 617, 641--42 (2008) [herei nafter 
Plank, Sense]. 
17. Alternatively, proceeds of the issuance may be paid to the originator as a return on its equity 
interest in the SPE. 
18. Of course, if the SPE has credit recourse against the originator (e.g., the originator has agreed 
to repurchase defaulted receivables or has guaranteed payment of the receivables), the originator' s 
bankruptcy would impair the SPE's ability to enforce the recourse obligation. But the bankruptcy would 
not impair its rights in respect of the receivables themselves. 
19. See Plank, Sense, supra note 16, at 618. 
20 . In its press release announcing the creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Faci lity (T ALF), the Federal Reserve Board observed: "New issuance of ABS [asset-backed securities] 
declined precipitously in September and came to a halt in October." Press Release, BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE fED. RESERVE SYS. (Nov. 25, 2008), 
http://www. federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm. T ALF was "a facility that 
will help market participants meet the credit needs of households and small businesses by support ing the 
iss uance of asset-backed securi ties (ABS) collateralized by student loans, auto loans, credit card loans, 
and loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration (SBA)." !d. 
21. See Plank, Sense, supra note 16, at 617-18, 618 n.4. For an illustration of the dec line in the 
volume of the global issuance of asset-backed securities from 2006 through 2011, see American 
Securitization Forum Presentation for the Financial Stabili ty Board, Current Market and Regulatory 
Environment for Securitization, at 2 (April 10, 2012), 
http ://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedfiles/ ASF _FSB _Presentation_ 4-1 0-12.pdf. For a 
compari son of the volume of issuance of asset-backed securities in the United States in 2006 and 2011, 
by asset class, see !d. at 3. 
22. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rollen Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1055 (1998); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk Allocation, 72 TUL. L. 
REV. 101 (1997); Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 
30 1 (2002); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. I (1996); Stephen J. Lubben, 
Beyond True Sales: Securitization and Chapter 11, I N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 89 (2004); Lois R. Lupica, 
Revised Article 9, The Proposed Bankruptcy Code Amendments and Securitizing Debtors and Their 
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also includes strong appreciation for the benefits of securitization as 
well as robust support for its doctrinal and normative soundness .23 
Regardless of whether this support is warranted (we generally think it 
is), securitization is here to stay?4 Accordingly, in this Article we avoid 
that debate. We take as given that the commercial law distinction 
between true sales and SISOs applies to securitization transactions, and 
we provide a methodology for drawing the distinction that is both 
practical and theoretically sound. 
III. CHARACTERIZATION UNDER ARTICLE 9 AND NONBANKRUPTCY LAW: 
WHAT ARE THE STAKES OUTSIDE OF B ANKRUPTCY? 
Although the need to characterize a securitization transaction as a true 
sale or SISO typically arises in the originator' s bankruptcy, we begin 
with nonbankruptcy law. As the Supreme Court explained, "[p ]roperty 
interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal 
interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests 
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is 
involved in a bankruptcy proceeding."25 Proceeding on the widely 
shared understanding that the nonbankruptcy standard for characterizing 
a transfer of property also applies in bankruptcy, we focus on the 
characterization of a transaction as a true sale of receivables or as a 
SISO for purposes ofUCC Article 9?6 
Creditors, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 32 1 (2002); Lois R. Lupi ca, Revised Article 9, Securitization 
Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. lNST. L. REv. 287 (200 1 ); Lois R. Lupica, 
Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory lnslitutionalization of Securitization , 33 CONN. 
L. REV. 199 (2000); Loi s R. Lupica, Asset Securitizmion: The Unsecured Creditor 's Perspective, 76 
TEX.L.REV. 595 (1998~ 
23. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Kettering, Pride and Prej udice in Securitization: A Reply to Professor 
Plank, 30 CARDOZO L. R EV. 1977 (2009) ; Plank, Sense, supra note 16; Thomas E. Plank, Th e Securitv 
of Securitization and the Future of Security, 25 CARDOZO L. R EV. 1655 (2004); Steven L. Schwarcz, 
The Future of Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REv. 13 13 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, The AlchemJ' of Asset 
Securitization, 1 STAN. JL. Bus. & FIN. 133, 135-45 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are 
Greater than the Who le: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance 
and Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLU:Vl. Bus. L. REv. 139 (1993). 
24. Kettering, who thinks " the doctrinal foundation s of the prototypical securitization transaction 
are shaky," Kettering, Discontents, supra note 14, at 1632, acknow ledges this point: 
If ... a court holds authoritative ly that the lega l doctrines on which the edifice of securi tization 
was constmcted do not achieve the hoped-for result .. . the result would be cataclysmic . ... It 
seems improbable that a court that is fully aware of these consequences would be willing to 
accept the responsibility of causing rhem by ruling that the legal doctrines relied upon to support 
securitization do not do their job. 
!d. at 1632- 33. 
25. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 , 55 (1979). 
26 . Tl1e preva iling v iew, which we share, is that nonbankmptcy law determines whether a 
transaction is a sa le or a SISO for bankmptcy purposes. However, Kenneth Kettering has suggested 
othe rwise. Kenneth C. Kettering, True Sale of Receivables: A Pwposive Analysis, 16 A.l'vl. B ANKR. 
2014] WHEN Is A DOG'S TAIL NOT A LEG? 1035 
The miginal UCC Article 9 covered sales of certain receivables: 
accounts and chattel paper. 27 By expanding the definition of "account" 
and by including sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, 
revised Article 9 expanded the scope of the article to cover sales of 
virtually all types of receivables.28 The principal effect of covering sales 
of receivables in Article 9 is to subject them to the perfection and 
priority rules applicable to SISO transactions (subject to an important 
exception, discussed below).Z9 Because Article 9 now covers most sales 
of receivables, in many circumstances the true sale versus SISO issue 
will have no relevance for commercial law purposes. However, there 
are some important aspects of Article 9 that do tum on the true sale-
SISO dichotomy. 30 
In a true sale of receivables, the debtor (seller)31 would not be entitled 
to a surplus or liable for a deficiency following a default because there is 
lNST. L. REV. 511, 558-62 (2008) [hereinafter Kettering, True Sale]. Kettering also has argued that 
bankruptcy policy might fairly be understood to require that receivables sold in a securitization be 
included in the originator's bankruptcy estate and has suggested ways in which the Bankruptcy Code 
might be applied to accomplish this result. Kettering, Discontents, supra note 14, at 1585- 1632. To 
date, bankruptcy courts have not adopted these arguments, and Kettering has acknowledged that they are 
unlikely to do so advertently. Nevertheless, the arguments may raise problems for securitization and 
other transactions in future bankruptcies . 
In a future article, we will consider securitization in the context of bankruptcy law and 
explain why the nonbankruptcy characterization of a transaction should and does apply in bankruptcy 
and articulate the reasons why bankruptcy policy, properly understood, is wholly consistent with giving 
respect in bankruptcy to securitization transactions that nonbankruptcy law characterizes as true sales. 
We also will explain why Kettering's potential bankruptcy policy analysis of true sales, fraudulent 
transfers, and substantive consolidation fails. 
27. The 1962 official text of Article 9 applied "to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel 
paper." U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(b) (1962). The 1972 revisions expanded the definition of "accounts" to 
include receivables that previously had been classified as "contract rights," compare id. § 9-106 (1972), 
with id. § 9-106 (1962), and eliminated all references to the latter, compare id. § 9-102(1) (1972), with 
id. § 9-1 02( 1) ( 1962 ). 
28 . "Revi sed Article 9" refe rs to the revision of Article 9 approved by the UCC's sponsors (Tne 
American Law Institute and the National Conference of Commiss ioners on Uniform State Laws) in 
1998. The categories of receivables that were added to the definition of "account" and those that were 
included in the definition of "payment intangibles" were classified as general intangibles under Former 
Article 9. See U.C.C. § 9-106 (1962) (defining "general intangibles"). Former Article 9 did not apply 
to sales of general intangibles of any category. The drafting history of the current definitions of 
"account" and "payment intangible" appears in Paul M. Shupack, Making Revised Article 9 Safe for 
Securitizations: A Brief HistOI)', 73 AM. B ANKR. L.J. 167 (1999), and Steven L. Harris & Charles W. 
Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CH!.-
KENTL. REv. 1357,1369- 74 (1999). 
Our references to "receivables" include the four types of receivables defined in Article 9: 
account (defined in § 9-1 02( a)(2 )), chattel paper (defined in § 9-1 02(a)(ll )), payment intangible 
(defined in § 9-1 02(a)(61 )), and promissory note (defined in § 9-l 02(a)(65)). 
29. U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 5 (2010). 
30. For a more detai led description and analysis of these aspects of Article 9, see Kettering, True 
Sale, supra note 26, at 532- 39. 
31. Article 9 defines "debtor" and ''secured party" to include, respectively, a seller and buyer of 
receivables. U.C.C. § 9-1 02(a)(28) (defining "debtor"); id. § 9-1 02(a)(73) (defining "secured party"). 
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no secured obligation and consequently there could be no "default" as 
contemplated by Article 9.32 For the same reason, the dt:~tor (seller) in a 
sale transaction has no right to redeem the collateral:'_) Moreover, a 
number of duties imposed on a secured party in a SISO transaction are 
not imposed on the secured party (buyer) in a sale transaction.34 These 
distinctions generally reflect the fact that a secured party (buyer) has 
acquired the entire interest of the debtor (seller) in the receivables sold.35 
Revised Article 9 emphatically makes this point by providing that "[a] 
debtor that has sold an account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or 
promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the 
collateral sold."36 
The most significant example of Article 9 treating a true sale 
differently from a SISO does not follow from the inherent economic 
differences between the two transactions. Under the "automatic 
perfection" rule for sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes, 
the security interest of a buyer of either type of receivable is perfected 
upon attachment.37 If a purported sale of such receivables were 
32. U.C.C. § 9-608(b) (application of proceeds of collection or enforcement); id. § 9-615(e) 
(application of proceeds of a disposition). Both of the cited subsections provide that if the underlying 
transaction is a sale of receivables, "the obligor is not liable for any deficiency." However, in sale 
transactions there is no "obligor" because there is no secured obligation. I d. § 9-1 02(a)(5 9) defines 
"obligor" as: 
a person that, with respect to an obligation secured by a security interest in ... the collateral, (i) 
owes payment or other performance of the obligation, (ii) has provided property other than the 
collateral to secure payment or other performance of the obligation, or (iii) is otherwise 
accountable in who!~ or in part for payment or other performance of the obligation. 
Reading these provisions charitably, the reference in each should be understood as a reference to the 
debtor (seller), not to an obligor. 
33. Jd. § 9-623. 
34. See, e.g., id. § 9-209(c) (duty to release account debtor not applicable to buyer of 
receivables); id. § 9-21 O(b) (duty to respond to requests for accounting, list of collateral, and statement 
of account); id. § 9-608(a) (duties with respect to application of proceeds and surplus); id. §§ 9-620, 9-
621, 9-622 (duties with respect to acceptance of collateral in satisfaction of obligation). ln addition, 
certain duties apply in a sale of receivables transaction only if there is a right of charge back or full or 
limited recourse exists. Jd. § 9-207(d) (duty of care as to collateral under secured party's possession or 
control); id. § 9-607(c) (duty to collect or enforce in commercially reasonable manner). 
35. Two exceptions to the priority rules relating to future advances also reflect the idea that those 
rules, which tum on the timing of "advances," do not make sense in the case of a buyer of rec eivables. 
!d. § 9-323(a), (b); see also Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 535- 36, 536 n.l 05. 
36. U.C.C. § 9-318(a). For purposes of priority, however, if a security interest held by a buyer of 
an account or chattel paper is unperfected, then the debtor (seller) is deemed to have the rights and title 
that was sold. !d. § 9-318(b). This puts the priority of an unperfected sec urity interest in sold 
receivables on a par with the priority of a SISO. Section 9-318(a) was intended to reject the holding of 
Octagon Gas 3ys., Inc. v. Rimmer, 995 F.2d 948 (1Oth Cir. 1993): because a buyer of a receivable 
acquires a security interest, the debtor (seller) necessarily retains some legal or equitable interest. 
37. U.C.C. § 9-309(a)(3) (payment intangible); id. § (a)(4) (promissory note). This rule 
represents an accommodation to entrenched practices in the bank loan participation market and 
recognizes that filing and searching in that market would be impracticable. For the background of this 
rule, see Shupack, supra note 28; Harris & Mooney, supra note 28, at 1369- 74. 
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recharacterized as a SISO, however, the security interest held by the 
purported buyer would be unperfected unless a financing statement had 
been filed. 38 In that posture, the battle over recharacterization would 
have high stakes indeed. But in securitization and other transactions 
outside of the loan participation and mortgage loan markets, 
precautionary filing of financing statements is the norm, even when true 
sale treatment is perceived as highly likely, so for most transactions the 
stakes for recharacterization are not so high. 39 
Practitioners and commentators alike have assumed that in typical 
securitization transactions the relevant "sale" may qualify as a "sale" 
within the meaning of section 9-1 09(a)(3) so as to be within the scope of 
Article 9.4° Kettering suggests, however, that "a respectable argument 
can be made" that one such typical transaction-a capital contribution of 
receivables by the originator to an SPE in exchange for stock issued by 
the SPE-is not a "sale" and so is excluded from Article 9.41 He notes 
that Article 9 does not define "sale" or "buyer" with respect to 
receivables and observes that, "[i]n common parlance, 'sale ' does not 
include every absolute conveyance, but only one made in exchange for a 
price in money paid or promised to be paid."42 It follows, the argument 
goes, that a "sale" does not include capital contributions or barter 
transactions.43 
Excluding non-SISO capital contributions of receivables from the 
scope of Article 9 would not affect the need to determine, and the basis 
for determining, whether any given contribution was a SISO or an 
outright assignment. Although Article 9 distinguishes between SISOs 
and true sales, it does not itself provide a method for distinguishing 
between the two. Thus the common law governs the characterization 
issue, regardless of whether the assignment transaction is covered by 
Article 9.44 Nevertheless, the stakes for securitizers and their investors 
would be substantial if Article 9 did not apply to non-SISO capital 
38. U .C.C. § 9-31 O(a). The purported buyer' s security interes t in promissory notes a lso cou ld be 
perfec ted by the secured party's taking possession, id. § 9-3 13(a), or temporarily without fi ling or the 
taking of possession, id. § 9-3 12( e). 
39. Of course, fo r the secured party who fails to fil e or perfect its security interes t by another 
method, recharacteriza tion can be fatal. This proved to be the case in the Commercial M oney Center 
bankruptcy. See In re Commercial Money Ctr., Inc ., 350 B.R. 465, 473-79 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding that a purported true sa le of payment intangibles was a S!SO); In re Commercial Money Ctr. , 
Lnc., 392 B.R. 814 (B .A.P. 9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the SISO was unperfected and so avoidable by 
the trustee in bankmptcy) . 
40 . U.C.C . § 9- 109(a)(3). 
41. Kettering, T111e Sale, supra note 26, at 513 n.5. 
42. !d. (citing BLACK'S L AW DICTIONARY 1364 (8th ed. 2004)). 
43. !d. 
44. "[N]either this Artic le [9] nor the definiti on of 'sec urity interest' ... delineates h01v a 
particular transaction is to be class ified. That issue is left to the courts." U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 4. 
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contributions. Article 9 specifies the steps that are necessary to create 
an enforceable sale of receivables, resolves competing claims to 
receivables that have been sold, repeals the rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 
details the obligations of persons obligated on these receivables, and to a 
considerable extent overrides legal and contractual restrictions on 
assignment.45 If non-SISO capital contributions are excluded trom 
Article 9, resolution of these issues would be left to nonuniform- and 
considerably less certain-common law. 
Indeed, the UCC sponsors' predominant motivation for bringing sales 
of virtually all types of receivables into Revised Article 9-by 
expanding the definition of "accounts" and adding sales of payment 
intangibles and promissory notes- was to provide for the first time a 
coherent, accessible, and uniform body of law to govern these transfers 
as well as to subject most of them to Article 9's public-notice regime.46 
These reforms were thought to be important in particular because of the 
prominence of receivables sales in securitizations.47 It would be an 
unfortunate and surprising result were Article 9 construed so as not to 
embrace transfers of receivables m connection with a typical 
securitization structure.48 
This statutory construction 1ssue 1s unlikely to anse with any 
frequency. Although in many securitization transactions some of the 
value of the receivables transferred to the buyer is treated as a capital 
contribution, only rarely is the entire value of the receivables so treated. 
That is, in the vast proportion of transactions in which the buyer makes a 
capital contribution, the buyer also pays money to the seller in exchange 
45. !d. § 9-203(b) (conditions to creation of an enforceable sale) ; id. § 9-317(a) (priority as 
against lien creditor); id. § 9-322(a) (priority as against competing secured party) ; id. § 9-205 (repeal of 
Benedict v. Ratner); id. § 9-406 (discharge of account debtor); id. § 9-408 (effect of legal and 
contractual restrictions on assignment). Benedict v. Ratner held that an assignment of accounts 
receivable that reserves to the assignor "dominion inconsistent with the effective dispos ition of title and 
creation of a lien'' is a fraudulent trans fer. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 363 (I 925) (applying New 
York law). 
46. Shupack, supra note 28; Harris & Mooney, supra note 28, at 13 72- 73. Note, however, that 
the application of Article 9 to sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes does not implicate the 
issue of public notice. The common law contains no public notice or perfection requirement, and sales 
of payment intangibles and promissory notes are automatically perfected under Revised Article 9. 
U.C.C. § 9-309(3). (4). However, a buy~r of these types of receivables may improve its priority by 
filing a financing statement covering them. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Using First 
Principles ofUCC Article 9to Solve Statutory Puzzles in Receivables Financing, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 297, 
309- ll (20 ll ). Contra Thomas E. Plank, Article 9 of the UCC: Reconciling Fundamemal PmpertF 
Principles and Plain Language, 68 Bus. LAW. 439 (2013). 
47. See Steven L. Schwarcz, The impact on Securitization of Revised UCC Article 9, 74 C:HI.-
KENT L. REV. 947 ( 1999); Shupack, supra note 28. 
48. Although his art icle expresses no view on the statutory construction issue, Kettering 
"agree[s] that it would be a bad thing for Article 9 not to apply to such transac tions." Memorandum 
from Ken Kettering to Steve Harris and Chuck Mooney 9 (July 29, 2013) [hereinafter Ketterin g 
Memorandum] (on file with authors). 
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for the receivables. There is no reason why these transactions, in which 
the capital contribution is only one component of the price, would not 
qualifY as sales. 
In addition, we see no reason why the word "sale" in Article 9 should 
be limited to transactions in which the price is paid in money. If, for 
example, the buyer (say, an SPE) is newly formed for the purpose of the 
transaction and the seller receives newly issued equity in exchange for 
the receivables, we would understand the transaction to be a sale and the 
equity to be the price of receivables. Even where the seller already 
owns equity in the buyer and the capital contribution has the effect of 
increasing the value of the buyer's equity holdings, the seller has 
received this increased value in exchange for the receivables. It follows 
that this increased value should be the price of the receivables and that 
the transaction should be considered a sale.49 
The interpretation of the scope of Article 9 in this context- what is a 
"sale"?-is illuminated by the explicit transactional exclusions provided 
in section 9-1 09( d). Certain sales and assignments of receivables are 
excluded from Article 9 because they do not relate to commercial 
financing transactions.50 No one disputes that securitizations are 
commercial financing transactions. 51 The application of Article 9 to 
securitization transactions was a focus of the revision effort, yet Revised 
Article 9 does not exclude outright transfers (sales) of interests in 
receivables as a contribution of capital in exchange for stock or as 
barter. Indeed, as far as we know, the participants in the revision 
process assumed that these transactions were "sales" within the meaning 
of Article 9. This suggests that "sale" should not be restricted to 
outright transfers in exchange for money paid or promised to be paid. 52 
49. We also think that such a capital contribution constitutes "value" for purposes of § 9-
203(b)( l ). A sell er that transfers receivables in a securitization transaction and receives credit for a 
capital contribution is not making a gift of the receivables. See U.C.C. § 1-204(4) (explaining that a 
person g ives "'value" for rights if the person "acquires them in return for any cons iderat ion sufficient to 
support a simple contact"). C.f In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp. , 6 F.3d 1119, 11 29 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(hold ing that indirect benefits to a corporation for making payments owed by an affi liate was "value" 
within the meanin g of the fraudulent transfer provisions of the Bankruptcy Code); Rubin v. Mfrs. 
Hanover Trust Co., 66 1 F.2d 979, 991-92 (2d Cir. 198 1) (discussing the indirect economic benefit to a 
transferor as "value"). 
50. See U.C.C. § 9-104(f) (1962), U.C. C. § 9-109(d)(4), (5), (6), (7) (2010); U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 
12 ("Paragraphs (4), (5), (6), and (7) of subsection (d) exclude from the Article certain sales and 
assignments of rece ivables that, by their nature, do not concern commerc ial financin g transactions."). 
51. Indeed, Kettering claims that "[t]he financing obtained by an Originator through the use of 
the prototypical sec uritization structure is economically equivalent to a nonrecourse loan by the 
financiers to the Originator that is secured by the assets used to support the fin ancing." Kettering, 
Disconlems, supra note 14, at 1570. 
52. Drawing negative impli cations from statutory language is not a preferred method of statutory 
interpretation. It may be risky and may lead to erroneous conclusions. In this situ ati on, however, the 
argument is one that an advocate likely would make in any litigation on the issue, and it is plausible that 
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Indeed, one might read section 1-103 as compelling courts to reject such 
a restriction. 53 
To sum up on the stakes of recharacterization outside of bankruptcy, 
the true sale-SISO determination can be quite significant under Article 9 
when a purported buyer of payment intangibles or promissory notes is 
relying on automatic perfection. In other contexts, however, two 
alternative generalizations apply: either Article 9 treats sales in 
essentially the same fashion as SISO transactions, or its differing 
treatment coherently reflects the inherent economic differences between 
the two types of transactions. 
IV. TRUE SALE VERSUS SISO: CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY 
A. Case Law 
We agree with most earlier observers that the case law addressing the 
proper characterization of a self-styled "sale" of receivables is 
confusing, inconsistent, and often incoherent, even though many 
reported decisions may have reached the correct results. Many of the 
opinions identify "factors" that represent either the "benefits" or 
"burdens" of ownership and then determine which of the benefits and 
burdens have been allocated to the purported seller and which have been 
allocated to the purported buyer. 54 The number of factors to which 
courts have referred is quite large, and although the courts take some 
factors into account more frequently than others, no standard list has 
developed. 55 
a court would afford the argument at least some weight. 
53. U.C.C. § l-103(a) provides as fo llows : 
(a) [The Uniform Commercial Code) must be liberall y construed and applied to promote its 
underlying purposes and policies, which are: 
(I) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercia l tran sactions; 
(2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and 
agreement of the parties; and 
(3) to make unifotm the law among the various jurisdictions. 
54. For an excellent but concise discussion (which is somewhat dated, but still relevant) of th e 
case law, see Robert D. Aicher & William J. Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of Receivables 
as a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon BankrupTcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181, 186- 98 
(199 1); see also Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 515-16 (discussing factors relied on by courts 
and comparing approach to early analyses of true lease versus SISO issue); Thomas E. Plank, The True 
Sale of Loans and the Role of Recourse, !4 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 287, 290-9 1, 3 13-28 ( 199 1) 
[hereinafter, Plank, True Sale] (discussing factors relied on by courts). 
55. John Hilson provides a nonexhaustive list of fifteen factors that "have turned up in cases as 
bearing on the 'true sale' question in the context of ascertaining whether the accounts form part of the 
bankruptcy estate of the seller .. . . " JOHN FRANCES HILSON, ASSET-BASED LENDING: A PRACTICt\L 
GU IDE TO SECURED FINANCING § 2:5.3 (20 13). He identifies the fo llowing as perhaps the most 
important: the level of any recourse the buyer may have against the seller with respec t to the 
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The opinions suffer from two serious deficiencies. First, the factors 
to which courts refer are in fact consistent with both a tme sale and a 
SISO. Standing alone, these factors cannot be outcome-determinative, 
and the fact that they are not necessary attributes of either a sale or a 
SISO makes them, at best, umeliable indicators of the economic 
substance of a transaction. Second, although several commentators have 
offered approaches to deal with the not unusual situation in which some 
of the perceived benefits and burdens are assigned to the purported 
buyer and others remain with the purported seller, none of the 
approaches has found favor with the courts. 
Judicial opinions that rely on factors to determine the characterization 
of a transaction often are based on the following false syllogism: 
Premise 1: Factor X is a typical attribute of ownership of receivables. 
Premise 2: Factor X is an attribute of purported seller A's relationship 
to the receivables. 
Conclusion: Purported seller A remains the owner of the receivables, 
and purported buyer B holds only a SISO. 
Alternatively, the following false syllogism sometimes applies: 
Premise 1: Factor Y is an attribute of ownership of receivables. 
Premise 2: Factor Y is not an attribute of purported buyer B's 
relationship to the receivables. 
Conclusion: Purported buyer B is not the owner of the receivables 
and holds only a SISO. 
For example, some courts have considered the purported seller's 
continued servicing (collecting and enforcing) of the transferred 
receivables to be an indication that the transaction was not a tme sale. It 
is a tmism that some owners of receivables service their own 
receivables, especially if they have not sold them. But it is also tme that 
some owners of receivables engage third parties to perform this 
function. Allowing the seller to continue servicing the receivables as the 
buyer's agent may well be the buyer's most efficient means of collecting 
them. The physical transfer of the servicing function is not without its 
costs. And especially when the seller originated the receivables, the 
seller's continuing relationship with the account debtors (obligors) may 
increase the likelihood of payment. The mere absence of a factor 
commonly associated with ownership does not compel the conclusion 
that the purported owner is not the tme owner. Indeed, the allocation of 
the servicing function per se is irrelevant to the characterization of the 
transaction. 56 
receivables; whether the seller collects the receivables and, if so, whether the seller is allowed to hold 
the proceeds and commingle them with its own funds; the purchase price; whether the parties' books 
reflect the transaction as a sale; and whether the buyer's return from the receivables is limited. !d. 
56. Some cases have concluded that continued servicing combined with the seller-servicer's 
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Some factors relied upon by the courts appear to address the parties' 
intentions or motivations as inferred from the terms of the transaction or 
the behavior of the purported buyer. The intuition underlying these 
factors is that if a purported buyer were really the owner under a true 
sale, it never would have agreed to such terms or behaved in such a 
manner. For example, terms that permit the purported seller to modify 
or compromise the receivables postsale fall into this category. 57 But 
these facts do not aid the recharacterization analysis. Particularly when 
the buyer and seller have a continuing relationship and the seller has a 
stake in maintaining its reputation, it may make good sense for the buyer 
to delegate such discretion to the seller. Or, it may be that the buyer 
agreed to improvident terms. In a similar vein, there is some case law 
support for the notion that a buyer's failure to independently investigate 
the creditworthiness of account debtors on transferred receivables 
suggests that the parties intended a secured loan rather than a sale. 58 But 
a buyer might properly rely on a seller's representations and warranties 
or on recourse against the seller instead of on an independent 
investigation. At most these types of factors might raise a suspicion 
warranting further analysis of the transaction. They should not, 
however, carry any weight in the analysis itself. 59 
The recharacterization case law not only relies on factors that, if not 
altogether irrelevant, are unreliable proxies for the economic substance 
of the transaction, it also lacks a method for resolving cases in which 
some of the factors appear to point in one direction and some in another. 
Over the past twenty-five years, several commentators have offered 
commingling of collections with its own funds is a strong indication that the purported seller remained 
the owner. See, e.g., People v. Serv. lnst., Inc ., 421 N.Y.S.2d 325, 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) 
(nonnotification, collections, and commingling). While such commingling might prevent the buyer 
from identifying the collected funds and so deprive the buyer of any property interest in them, the fac t of 
commingling should not of itself detennine that the buyer is not the owner of the uncollected 
receivables. Owners sometimes enable third parties to deprive them of their property . See, e.g., U .C. C. 
§ 2-403(2) ("Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of th at kind gives 
him power to transfer all rights of the en truster to a buyer in ordinary course of business . •· ). 
57. See, e.g., N. Trust Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 619 F. Supp. 1340 (W.O. Okla. 1985). 
58. See. e.g , Mid-Atlantic Supply, Inc. v. Three Rivers Aluminum Co., 790 F.2d 11 2 1, 11 23 
(4th Cir. 1986). 
59. Aicher and Fellerhoff accurately portray another "factor" : 
Where other fac tors are present, the courts will often discuss the language that the parties have 
used in the document or agreement governing the transaction. Courts focus on tenns such as 
"security" or "collateral" where the other factors indi cate a loan, and on tenns such as "sale" or 
"absolutely convey" where other factors support (or do not preclude) sale treatment. For one 
court, the language in an agreement and conduct of the parties triumphed over full recourse 
provisions, and the court found a sale. Most courts, however, de-emphasize the language used in 
a document, and consider intent and actual conduct more relevant. 
Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 54, at 194 (footnotes omitted). As we explain below, we think the 
parties' expressed intention concerning the legal characterization of the transaction is by and large 
irrelevant. 
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narrowly focused factors-based methodologies for bringing some order 
to the true sale analysis. Chief among these are Robert Aicher and 
William Fellerhoff,60 Thomas Plank,61 and Peter Pantaleo.62 Their 
methodologies have their substantive shortcomings, which we discuss 
below.63 For present purposes, however, it is sufficient to observe that 
although judicial discussions of the recharacterization issue refer to the 
articles in which these methodologies appear, no court has relied on any 
of these methodologies to resolve the issue. In 2008, Kenneth Kettering 
advocated rejecting the factors-based approach entirely, arguing that a 
purpmied true sale should be recharacterized only when necessary to 
promote the purpose of recharacterization, the prevention of forfeiture.64 
Thus far, Kettering's proposal has met the same judicial fate as his 
predecessors': It has been cited by the courts but not adopted. 
Thus the courts' continue to rely on a recharacterization approach that 
ultimately is based on their intuitive judgments about whether a given 
transaction seems more like a sale than like a SISO. This 
impressionistic approach, with its inherent uncertainty, has proven 
costly to parties both in and out of the securitization industry. The state 
of play in the case law on the true sale-SISO issue is similar to early 
case law on the lease versus security interest issue. 65 We are hopeful 
that the property-based approach that we explain in Part V and that 
proved successful in rationalizing the case law on recharacterization of 
leases of goods will succeed likewise with respect to the 
recharacterization of true sales of receivables. 66 
60. Aicher & Fe llerhoff, supra note 54. 
6 1. Plank, True Sale, supra note 54. 
62. Peter V. Pantaleo et a!., Rethinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52 
Bus . LAW. !59 ( 1996). Panta leo is identified as the "Reporter" and nine other coauthors are listed 
(inc luding Thomas Plank, some of whose work we address in thi s paper). For convenience our 
discuss ion refers to Pantaleo as the author. We discuss in more detail our views on the role of recourse 
against a seller as well as the vi ews of other observers infra. 
63 . See infra Part IV.B.l. 
64. Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26. As we explain infra Part IV.B.2, Kettering 's 
meth odology is a clear improvement over the facto rs-based approaches but still has some substantive 
difficulties. 
65. " [C]ourts generally proceed [on the true sale issue] as they did in the early days of true lease 
adjudication: namely, they make an intuitive judgment about the similarity of the transaction in question 
to the court's notion of an idea l sale (lease) or ideal secured loan (sale with retained security interest), 
based on an ad hoc se lection of factors that strike the court as relevant in the particular case." Kettering, 
True Sale, supra note 26, at 516 (citing Corinne Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease Under 
the UCC, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 201 ( 1988)). 
66 . We are quick to acknowledge that success of this approach in the lease context was due in no 
small part to the fact that it was codifi ed in U.C.C. § l-203. However, the approach was beginning to 
take hold in the case law even before codification. 
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B. Commentary 
Resolving the uncertainty prevailing in the case law would be a 
notable accomplishment for any methodology. We offer our approach 
not only with that desideratum in mind but also with the goal of 
providing a method for distinguishing tme sales from SISOs on the basis 
of their economic substance. To fully appreciate the substantive merits 
of our approach, it will be useful to understand how it differs from the 
factors-based and purposive approaches referred to above. To this end, 
we describe those approaches briefly in this Part before presenting the 
details of our own approach in Part V . 
1. The "Factors" or "Benefits and Burdens" Approaches 
Aicher and Fellerhoffs approach turns on a factor with a more 
venerable past than the factors discussed above (e .g., servicing and 
compromising the receivables): a material disparity between the sale 
price and the value of the property purportedly sold. 67 They described 
their "reasoned analytical approach to the recourse issue" as follows: 
[W]hat would an informed and willing buyer pay a willing seller for a 
transfer of the entire bundle of risks and benefits embodied in the cash 
flow represented by the receivables? If the ultimate price that the 
transferee pays, taking into account the presence of any direct and 
indirect recourse provisions, is notably less than this amount, a court 
should conclude that the transaction is a secured loan. 
[The] analysis ... in its most basic form, inquires whether the purchaser 
has paid the reasonable equivalent of a fair market price for the 
receivables. The analysis permits a court to find a transaction to be a 
sale, notwithstanding discounts, holdback reserves or other forms of 
recourse in excess of historical default rates. Hence it is suggested that, 
in applying an objective analysis to the impact that recourse should have 
in the characterization of a receivables transfer, a bankruptcy court should 
not take an inflexible, dollar-for-dollar approach.68 
The doctrinal hook on which Aicher and Fellerhoff rely is the line of 
cases holding that a deed absolute to real propertl9 nonetheless can be 
recharacterized as a mortgage securing an obligation, thus permitting the 
transferor to claim a right of redemption. 70 "As a general mle these 
67. Aicher & Fellerh off, supra note 54 , at 207- 10. 
68 . /d. at207, 21 0 . 
69. Unlike the traditiona l common law mortgage, a "deed abso lute" conveys the real property 
but contain s no conditi on of defeasance. GRANT S. N ELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, R EA L ESTATE 
FINANC E LAW § 3.5 (5th ed. 2007). 
70. "N umerous court decis ions .. . ex.ami ne whether a transfer by deed represents a mortgage or 
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courts have found that a purchase price significantly less than the market 
value of the property is highly suggestive of a mortgage."71 Although 
many cases contain statements indicating that a disparity between the 
price and the value of the property conveyed is not dispositive, it 
appears that such a disparity actually was dispositive in many cases. 72 
Aicher and Fellerhoff recognized that no court had adopted an 
approach like the one they proposed, and consequently they 
recommended that transacting parties place most or all of the benefits 
and burdens of ownership with the buyer (i.e., play the "factors" 
game ). 73 Thomas Plank's "analytical methodology" seeks to provide 
more flexibility to the parties than Aicher and Fellerhoffs play-it-safe 
approach. 74 Like Aicher and Fellerhoff, Plank focuses on the 
relationship between the value of the receivables and the price paid for 
them. 75 A court applying Plank's approach would allow tlue sale 
treatment if (i) the documents and conduct of the parties clearly indicate 
that the transaction is a sale, (ii) the buyer assumes some of the burdens 
of ownership or an allocation of burdens is difficult to determine, and 
(iii) the buyer pays "fair value" for the receivables. 76 
While Plank's methodology seems relatively straightforward, he 
appreciates the inherent complexity of the analysis. For example, as 
Plank explains: 
There is a corollary to this rule: If the documents and the actions are 
ambiguous on the characterization of the transaction, then the courts 
should weigh the price paid for the property against the allocation of 
burdens and benefits . If the buyer pays an amount that is in the higher 
range of fair value for the property, the transaction should be 
characterized as a sale if the buyer assumes a substantial portion of the 
benefits and burdens, but not necessarily a preponderance. If the buyer 
pays a price in the lower range, then he would need to assume a 
preponderance of those benefits and burdens. If the transferee paid less 
than fair value for the property, the transaction should be characterized as 
a secured loan unless he had substantially all of the benefits and 
a true conveyance of title. " Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 54, at 209 (citing Annotation, Value of 
Property as Factor in Determining Wh ether Deed Was Intended as lv!ortgage, 89 A.L.R.2d I 040, I 042 
( 1963) (supplementing Annotation, Value of Property as Factor in Determining Whether Deed intended 
as Mortgage , 90 A.L.R. 953,954 (1934))). 
71. !d. 
72 . NE LSON & WHITMAN, supra note 69, § 3.8 n.9. We explain below that even a s ignificant 
d ispa rity between the purchase price of receivables and their value is not incons istent with a true sale 
and so should not ipso fac to compel the conclusion that the transaction is a SISO. See infra Part V.B 
(Examp le 5) . 
73. Aicher & Fell erh oft~ supra note 54, at 211. 
74. Plank, True Sale, supra note 54, at 328. 
75. Jd.at334-37. 
76 . Jd. 
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burdens. 
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Whether or not such ambiguity in the parties ' documents and actions 
exists, Plank's impressionistic approach necessarily involves the 
identification, and allocation to one party or the other, of various 
burdens and benefits that seem to correlate with ownership. Moreover, 
he suggests giving weight to such noneconomic factors as the parties' 
accounting treatment and any descriptions of a transaction given to third 
parties.78 And, as we explain below, the relationship between the price 
of receivables and their value does not deserve the prominent (even if 
not determinative) role that it plays in Plank's analysis.79 
Whereas Aicher and Fellerhoff and Plank emphasize the value that a 
purported buyer of receivables gives to the purported seller (i.e., the 
purported price), Peter Pantaleo focuses principally on the nature of the 
seller' s obligation to the buyer (i .e. , the secured obligation, if the 
transaction were recharacterized).80 Pantaleo is not the first to focus on 
the seller 's obligation to the buyer, which is nothing more or less than 
the buyer's right of recourse against the seller. The buyer's right of 
recourse against the seller has been treated as a powerful, if not 
conclusive, indication that the transaction is not a true sale.81 Such 
recourse may take various forms, including the seller's guaranty of the 
obligations of the account debtors on the receivables or its agreement to 
repurchase a receivable upon the account debtor' s default. Some 
recourse arrangements contemplate that the buyer will hold back a 
percentage of the sale price to be applied against defaulted receivables. 
The thinking behind this emphasis on recourse against the seller seems 
to be that the chief burden in respect of a receivable is the risk of the 
account debtor's default and nonpayment. If the purported seller has 
retained that risk, the argument goes, then the purported buyer has not 
taken on an important attribute of ownership.82 
Pantaleo emphasizes the question whether the seller ' s obligation has 
the attributes of a borrower's obligation to repay a loan. He draws a 
77 . !d. at 329 n.l 52 . 
78 . Jd. at 333 . 
79 . See infra Part V.B (Example 5). 
80 . Pantaleo et a!. , supra note 62 . 
8 1. See, e.g. , ST EVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO TH E PRINC IPLES OF 
ASSET SECURITIZATION § 4 :2 (Adam D. Ford ed ., 2010) ("The most signifi cant fa cto r in the tru e sale 
determination appears to be the nature and extent of recourse that the transferee of the rece ivabl es has 
against the transferor."). We discuss in more detail our views on the role of recourse aga inst a selle r as 
well as the v iews of other observers elsewhere in thi s paper. See infra Part V.B. 
82 . As expla ined elsewhere, however, we are not alone in our view that the ri ght to receive 
payments from the account debtors is an even more sign ifi cant attribute of ownership. See inji"a pp. 30, 
4 1--42. And if the purported buyer has acqu ired those rights to the exclusion of the purported se ll er, the 
buyer must have become the owner regardless of its recourse against the seller. See id. 
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sharp distinction between two different types of seller recourse 
obligations in this respect. The first type is "[ r ]ecourse for 
collectibility," which he describes as "the equivalent of warranting that 
the asset will perform in accordance with its terms."83 Collectibility 
recourse could take forms such as a guaranty of the assigned receivables 
or an obligation to repurchase a receivable in the case of default. 
Because this recourse derives from the qualities of the assets being sold, 
it is akin to warranties of quality that typically accompany sales of other 
types of property, such as goods. 84 According to Pantaleo, such 
recourse is consistent with true sale treatment and not indicative of a 
loan.85 
Pantaleo identifies a second type of recourse as "economic recourse." 
He explains that "[ e ]conomic recourse is the equivalent of warranting a 
return to the buyer of its investment [the putative sales price] plus an 
agreed upon yield unrelated to the asset's payment terms."86 Economic 
recourse "goes beyond the quality of the asset and ensures an economic 
rate of return to the purported buyer that is unrelated to the payment 
terms of the underlying asset . . . . "87 Pantaleo argues that economic 
recourse demonstrates that the "underlying asset ... serves merely as 
collateral and the transaction is susceptible to being recharacterized as a 
loan. "88 We are skeptical of this approach. 89 
Aicher and Fellerhoff, Plank, and Panteleo sought to bring some order 
from chaos, but none adequately identifies exactly what it is that 
distinguishes a true sale from a SISO. Rather, each adopts the 
conventional approach of analyzing whether and to what extent the 
purported buyer has succeeded to and assumed the "benefits and 
burdens" of ownership. Each also denounces the approach of many 
courts looking to various "factors" and assessing whether overall the 
transaction "seems" more like a sale than a secured loan. Instead, each 
claims to have discovered a more coherent approach for the 
characterization puzzle. But each ultimately embraces some f.0rm of the 
"factors" approach, even if implicitly and grudgingly. 90 
83. Pantaleo et al., supra note 62, at 163. 
84. E.g. , U.C.C. § 2-314(a) (providing that a warranty that goods are merchantable is ordinarily 
implied in a contract for their sale). 
85. Pantaleo et al., supra note 62, at 171. We agree, as do others such as Kettering. Kettering, 
True Sole, supra note 26, at 542-43. 
86. Pantaleo et al., supra note 62, at 163. 
87. !d. 
88. Jd 
89. See infi"a Part V. 
90. Aicher and Fellerhoff recommend structuring transactions with an eye to the risks and 
benefits of ownership. Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 54, at 211. Plank's formula also involves 
weighing the benefits and burdens of ownership. Plank, True Sale, supra note 54, at 328-30. 
-·-~-.... 
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2. Kettering 's "Purposive Analysis" 
Kettering rej ects the factors-based approaches of Aicher and 
Fellerhoff, Plank, and Pantaleo as "offer[ing] little more than their own 
intuitive notions of sale and secured loan."9 1 He offers instead a 
"purposive analysis." Recharacterization, he claims, is an antiforfeiture 
doctrine.92 The sole purpose of recharacterizing a sale of receivables as 
a SISO is to protect the purported seller from suffering a forfeiture in the 
event the seller fails to perform as contemplated by the parties.93 One 
should recharacterize a purported sale of receivables as a SISO only 
when recharacterization is necessary to accomplish this purpose.94 
Under Kettering's purposive approach, the decision whether to 
recharacterize is based on the consequences of the decision rather than 
an intuitive sense of whether the transaction seems more like a sale or 
more like a SISO. Such an approach may yield more predictable results 
than the factors-based approaches it rejects.95 We think the results that 
Kettering reaches are for the most part correct.96 We also agree that the 
purposes and policies underlying Article 9 have some bearing on the 
recharacterization decision97 and that these purposes and policies may 
differ from those applicable in other settings where the distinction must 
be drawn, such as when construing the tax and usury laws.98 
Nevertheless, our approach is fundamentally different from 
Kettering 's . Kettering argues that the "purpose" of recharacterization 
"should determine the circumstances in which recharacterization is 
appropriate. "99 According to Kettering, "a sale should be 
recharacterized as a secured loan if the result otherwise would be an 
arrangement in which the seller is at risk of suffering a forfeiture in the 
Pantaleo' s focu s on the nature of recourse--collectibility or economic-appears to invoke the idea that 
economic recourse possesses the characteristics typical of a loan. Pantaleo et al. , supra note 62, at 17 1. 
91 . Kettering, Tnte Sale, supra note 26, at 51 6 . 
92. !d. at 531. 
93. !d. at 512 C'[N]othing in Article 9 of the UCC al ters the historical purpose of 
recharacteriza tion . .. . "); id. at 539 (discussing other poss ible purposes for recharacterizat ion and 
concluding that "nothing in the stmcture of Article 9 . .. prov ides a good reason for recharacteri za tion 
of a sale of receivables to be governed by a standard different from the antiforfeiture principle from 
which the doctrine evolved"). 
94. !d . at 526 ("Analysis should begin by asking the purpose of recharacteri zation, and that 
purpose should determine th e circumstances in which recharacterization is appropriate.") . 
95 . Th is is not to suggest that the approach does not require the exercise of judgment; it does. !d. 
at 530-3 1 (explaining that the principle for recharacterizing calls for judgments of probability and 
estimates of value). 
96 . See infra Part V. 
97. See U.C.C. § l-1 03(a) (providing that "[The Uniform Commercial Code) must be liberally 
constmed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies .... "). 
98. See Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 546. 
99. !d. 
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event that he fails to perform a contemplated act." 100 We think that 
Kettering has it backwards. The reason a sale must be recharacterized 
as a SISO is because the "seller" retained an interest in the receivables 
that secures an obligation, and consequently the transaction is the 
functional and economic equivalent of a SIS0. 101 Protection against 
forfeiture is a consequence of-and not the reason for-the 
recharacterization. And recharacterization of a purported sale may be 
appropriate even when the terms of the transaction would not result in a 
forfeiture. 102 
Consider, for example, the simplest sale of a receivable imaginable: a 
nonrecourse sale for an up-front cash price and with the seller retaining 
no rights, control, or interest in the receivable and no direct or indirect 
benefits of, or other connection with, the receivable after the sale. Then 
consider an explicit srso transaction involving a debtor's grant of a 
security interest to secure its debt to a secured party (which implicitly 
incorporates the concept imposed by law that the security interest 
vanishes upon satisfaction of the debt). Is the former a true sale and the 
latter a srso because it is necessary to protect the debtor's equity of 
redemption in the latter and not in the former? Certainly not. Article 9 
treats them differently because of the economic substance of the 
transactions are different. The debtor's equity of redemption is 
protected in the latter because it is a SISO. It is not a SISO because it is 
necessary to protect the debtor's equity of redemption. The application 
of Article 9 turns on the characterization of the transaction. 
V. A PROPERTY-BASED APPROACH TO DISTINGUISHING A TRUE SALE 
FROM A SISQ 
A. Building on the Lease Versus SISO Analysis 
As we have noted, Article 9 does not define the terms "sale" and 
''security interest that secures an obligation," even though it draws 
important distinctions between them. 103 To a considerable extent, 
Kettering's approach to recharacterization of a purported true sale of 
receivables, under which a transaction is recharacterized only when 
necessary to achieve a desired result (prevention of forfeiture), 
eliminates any need to define these terms or otherwise imbue them with 
content outside the forfeiture context. 104 We think that these terms, 
I 00. Jd. at 531. 
I 0 l. See infra notes l 06-116 and accompanying text. 
I 02. See infra Part V. B (Example I). 
I 03. See supra notes 40-43. 
104. Kettering's approach requires one to recharacterize a transaction in order to protect the 
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although undefined, have content, that their content reflects the 
functional and economic substance of the transactions they 
encompass, 105 and that Article 9 distinguishes between the two concepts 
on the basis of their substance. The substance of the transactions, in 
tum, depends on the functional and economic attributes of the property 
interests that the purported buyer and purported seller enjoy after the 
purported sale occurs. In our view, a transaction should be 
recharacterized as a SISO if the interest transferred to the purported 
buyer is in fact not the functional and economic equivalent of ownership 
but rather the functional and economic equivalent of a security interest 
that secures an obligation. 
How, then, can one determine whether a transferee of receivables 
acquires an interest that is the functional and economic equivalent of 
ownership, in which case the purported sale would not be 
recharacterized, or of a SISO, in which case recharacterization would be 
dictated? Fortunately, we need not reinvent the wheel. Courts must 
make the same determination, i.e. , whether a transferee acquires an 
interest that is the functional and economic equivalent of ownership, 
when distinguishing a true lease of goods from a purported lease that 
creates a SIS0. 106 The proper characterization of a purported lease of 
goods has been the subject of a considerable amount of thoughtful 
analysis , the best of which was incorporated into UCC Article 1. 107 By 
bringing to bear the experience and learning with respect to the 
characterization of purported leases, one can "solve" the 
recharacterization problem with respect to purported sales of 
receivables. 
When the parties enter into a purported lease of goods, the purported 
lessor is the owner of the goods . If the transaction is a true lease, the 
purported seller from the risk of suffering a forfeiture fo r failing to make a contemplated perfonnance. 
But. in our view, before one can protect the seller from this risk, one must determine whether the sell er 
has retained an interes t in the recei vables, whether the parties contemplate a tuture perfom1ance, and 
\vhether the seller' s interest would be forfeited if perfmmance is not fo rthc oming. 
105. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(l) (Article 9 applies to "a transaction , regardless of its form , that 
creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract"). See also id. § 1-203 cmt. 2 
(explaining that subsection (b), which sets fort h circumstances where a transacti on in th e form of a lease 
creates a security interest, "focus[ es] on economics"). 
106. Kettering has noted that the state of play in the case law on the true sale issue is similar to 
early case law on the lease versus security interest issue. "[C]ourts generally proceed [on the true sa le 
issue] as they did in the early days of true lease adjudication: namely, they make an intuitive judgment 
about the similarity of the transacti on in question to the court 's notion of an ideal sale ( lease) or ideal 
sec ured loan (sale with retained security inte rest), based on an ad hoc selection of factors that strike the 
court as relevant in the pa11icular case." Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 516 (citing Cooper, 
supra note 65, at 20 I). 
107. U.C.C . § 1-203 (di stinguishing a lease from a security interest). For an overview of these 
provisions as they appeared in former Article l, see Steven L. Harris, The lnteljace Between Articles 2A 
and 9 Under the Official Text and the California Amendments, 22 UCC L.J. 99, 101-110 ( 1989). 
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lease contract affords to each party a leasehold interest in the goods. 
The lessee acquires the right to possession and use of the goods for the 
term of the lease, subject to the right of the lessor to recover the goods in 
the event that the lessee defaults on rental or other obligations. 108 In 
addition, the lessor retains a residual interest in the goods, i.e., an 
"interest in the goods after expiration, termination, or cancellation of the 
lease contract." 109 Put otherwise, the lessor remains the owner of the 
goods, subject to the lessee's leasehold interest. 
The legal issue surrounding characterization usually is cast as 
follows: should the interest retained by the purported lessor be 
recharacterized as a security interest? Because the right to recover the 
goods upon default is consistent with both a true lease and a SISO, the 
answer turns in large part on whether the transaction is structured so 
that, at the end of the lease term, the purported lessor will enjoy a 
"meaningful" residual interest. 11 0 If the transaction is structured in such 
a way that, when the parties enter into it, the lessor reasonably expects 
to recover the goods and that the goods will have economic value in 
excess of scrap, the lease will not be recharacterized. Rather, the law 
will give effect to the parties' characterization and treat the lessor, who 
is expected to retain a meaningful residual interest in the goods, as the 
owner; the lessee will hold only a leasehold interest. Article 2A, and not 
Article 9, will govern the rights of the parties on the lessee's default. Its 
remedial scheme allocates to the owner-lessor any unexpected increase 
or decrease in the residual value of the goods. 111 
On the other hand, if the transaction is structured in such a way that, 
when the parties enter into it, the lessor does not reasonably expect to 
recover the goods unless the lessee fails to pay the purchase price (rent), 
then the "lessee" can be expected to enjoy the functional and economic 
equivalent of ownership. Under these circumstances, the "lessor"-as 
an economic, and therefore as a legal, matter- holds a security interest 
in the goods and not a residual ownership interest. Regardless of 
whether the parties subjectively intended to enter into a lease and not a 
secured transaction, and regardless of the label they applied to the 
transaction, the "lessor" is an Article 9 secured party and the "lessee" is 
I 08. :J.C.C . § 2A-l 03(l)(m) (defining "leasehold interest"). 
I 09. !d. § 2A-I 03( 1 )( q) ( detining "lessor' s residual interest"). 
1 10. This is the upshot of the tests provided in U.C.C . § l-203(b ). 
111. See U.C.C. § 2A-527(2); id. § 2A-528(1). Stripped to their essentials, these sections limit a 
defaulting lessee's liability for damages to (i) past due rent, (ii) the difference between the present value 
of the lessee's rental obligation for the remainder of the lease tem1 and the present value of the market 
rent for that term, and (i ii) incidental damages less expenses saved by the lessor in consequence of the 
default. So if, for example, the lessee defau Its and the lessor repossesses and sells the goods, the 
lessee's liability is unaffected by the amount of the purchase price. 
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the owner and an Article 9 debtor. 11 2 Article 9's remedial scheme 
applies, not Article 2A' s. Article 9 protects the "lessee's" (debtor's) 
ownership by affording the "lessee" a nonwaivable right to redeem the 
collateral (the "leased" goods) and a nonwaivable right to recover any 
surplus proceeds of a foreclosure sale or other disposition. 11 3 
The analysis of a purported true sale of receivables is the minor 
image of the true lease analysis. In the case of a purported sale of 
receivables, when the parties enter into the transaction the seller is the 
owner of the receivables. The parties agree that ownership is conveyed 
to the buyer. If in fact the buyer acquires the functional and economic 
equivalent of ownership, then the sale is a true sale and Article 9 affords 
no redemption rights to the seller. But if the buyer acquires only a 
limited interest, i.e., if the seller has not transfened all of its interest in 
the "sold" receivables, then the transaction should be recharacterized. 114 
To summarize, in a recharacterized sale of receivables, the initial 
owner of the collateral is the seller-debtor that is transfening a security 
interest to the buyer-secured party. In a recharacterized lease of goods, 
the initial owner of the goods is the lessor-secured party that is selling 
the goods to the lessee-debtor and retaining a security interest. In the 
former context, the exercise is to determine whether the "seller" 
transfened all of its interest to the "buyer" or whether it transfened only 
a security interest and retained some interest. In the latter context, the 
goal is to determine whether the "lessor" transfened all of its interest in 
the goods to the "lessee," retaining only a security interest, or whether 
the lessor retained a residual interest in the goods upon termination or 
completion of the lease term. 
Consider another perspective: one might address the characterization 
issue with respect to both leases of goods and sales of receivables by 
focusing on whether the original owner (lessor or seller) has conveyed to 
the transferee (lessee or buyer)-and whether the transferee has 
acquired-the functional and economic equivalent of ownership. If the 
answer is "yes," then the lease will be recharacterized as a secured sale 
112. As the offic ial comments explain: 
When a security interest is created, this Article applies regardless of the form of the transaction 
or the name that parties have given to it. Likewise, the subjective intention of the parties with 
respect to the legal characterization of their transaction is irrelevant to whether this Article 
applies .... 
U.C.C. § 9-109 cmt. 2 (20 10). 
11 3. See id. § 9-623 (affording a debtor the right to redeem collateral); id. § 9-615(d) (affording a 
debtor a rignl to payment of any surplus); id. § 9-602(4), (II) (providing that a debtor may not waive or 
vary the rules stated in §§ 9-623 and 9-615(d)). 
114. Cf Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 533 ("[W)hen the parties to a conveyance of a 
receivable refer to it as a 'sale,' they normally intend that the seller is transferring to the buyer all of the 
seller's rights in the receivable .... "). 
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(SISO) but the sale of receivables will not be recharacterized. If the 
answer is "no," then the lease of goods will not be recharacterized but 
the sale of receivables will be. Alternatively, one might conduct the 
equivalent analysis by focusing on what the transferor retained. If the 
lessor retained the functional and economic equivalent of ownership, 
then the transaction is a true lease. If the seller of receivables retained 
such an interest, then the transaction is not a true sale. This analysis is 
reflected in Table 1. 
Table 1 
True Lease of Goods True Sale of Receivables 
Lessor retains ownership Seller retains no interest 
Lessee acquires limited interest 
Buyer acquires ownership 
(leasehold) 
Lease Recharacterization as SISO 
Sale of Receivables Recharacterized 
as SISO 
"Lessor" retains limited interest 
"Seller" retains ownership 
(SISO) 
"Lessee" acquires ownership 
"Buyer" acquires limited interest 
(SISO) 
As the foregoing suggests, the purported seller's retention of an 
interest in receivables that have been "sold" is an essential component of 
a SISO. Stated otherwise, for a SISO to arise, the "seller" must not have 
transferred all of its interest in the receivables. Of course, not every 
interest retained by a "seller" of receivables is a SISO. By definition, 
for a SISO to arise there must also be an obligation that is secured by the 
transferred receivables. 115 In the present context, this normally would 
mean that there must be an obligation of the purported seller to the 
purported buyer of the receivables that is secured by the receivables. 
The transfer of receivables from the seller to the buyer cannot be a SISO 
unless such a secured obligation can be identified. 11 6 
11 5. U.C.C. § l-20 1(b)(35) ('"Secmity interest' means an interest in personal property or fix tures 
which secures payment or performance of an obligation ."). 
11 6. The existence of a secured obligation also plays an important role in distingui shing leases 
from securi ty interests. It has long been understood that a lease with a nominal purchase option may be 
a true lease nevertheless if the lease is terminable by the lessee. In that case there may be no meaningful 
obligation suffic ient to support a SJSO characterization. Thi s is the point of a problem in our casebook 
based on the in fa mous case of In re Royer's Bake1y, inc., I UCC Rep. Serv . 342 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1963). 
STEVEN L. HARRIS & CHARLES W. MOONEY, J R., SECURITY INTERESTS IN P ERSONAL PROPERTY 318-19 
(Problem 5.1.2), 324 (Note (3) on The Importance of the Lessee's Contractual Obligation) (5 th ed. 
20 II); see also Peter F. Coogan, Leases of Equipment and Some Other Unconventional Security 
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Of course, the lease- SISO and the true sale- SISO analyses are not 
identical, and we do not claim that they are or should be. Rather, our 
claim is that various components of the lease- SISO analysis are 
applicable and instructive in the true sale- SISO analysis. In each case, 
the goal-to ascertain the economic substance of the transaction-is the 
same. So are many of the consequences of recharacterization. Just as 
when a purported lease is recharacterized as a SISO the ownership 
interest of the purported lessee is entitled to the benefits of Article 9' s 
antiforfeiture provisions, so when a purported sale of receivables is 
recharacterized the ownership interest of the purported seller is entitled 
to those same protections. 117 And just as when a purported lease is 
recharacterized the resulting security interest is at risk unless it is 
perfected, the same consequences follow when a purported sale is 
recharacterized and the resulting security interest is unperfected. 118 
Inasmuch as the purpose and effect of each recharacterization is to 
determine whether the provisions of Article 9 governing SISOs apply to 
the transaction in question, we think it makes perfect sense in the sale-
of-receivables context to use the economic-substance analysis that has 
proven so successful in the leasing context. 
It is true that the principal non bankruptcy effect of recharacterizing a 
purported lease as a SISO is to subject it to the Article 9 filing rules, 
whereas in most cases sales of receivables are already subject to the 
filing rules. 119 But it does not follow from the differences in principal 
effects that differing methodologies are appropriate for determining 
whether a transaction is a SISO. The effects of the recharacterization of 
sales of receivables and leases flow from the terms of Article 9. The 
purpose and effect of either recharacterization is to apply to the 
transaction the rules of Article 9 applicable to a SISO. 
In determining whether those rules would apply to a purported lease, 
Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201 (37) and Article 9, 1973 D UKE L.J. 909 , 91 8, 923- 27 , 932 -
42 (di scussing the sign ificance of a purported lessee' s obligation to pay an amount equi valent to the 
purchase pri ce). It is also the reason why a lease will not be recharacterized as a SISO under th e "per 
se" rules of U. C.C. § l-203(b) unless the consideration to be paid to lessor is the lessee' s "o bligat ion for 
the term of the lease" and is " not subject to termination by the lessee .... " U.C .C. § l-203(b). 
117. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-615(d)(l) (providing for a nonwaivable right to any surplus of a 
di sposition after default). There is, of course, a difference in the applicable remedial scheme if these 
transactions are not recharacteri zed. The true lessor of goods will enjoy the rem edies under Arti c le 2A 
if the lessee breaches the terms of the lease, see supra note Ill , whereas the true buyer may have no 
statutory remedy against the seller because the buyer may have no obligation to the selle r. See U.C.C. 
§ 9-6!5(e) lproviding that if the underl ying transaction is the sale of receivables, there is no liability for 
a deficiency); see also supra note 32 (explaining that "obligor" should read "seller") . 
11 8. See, e.g., U. C.C. § 9-3 17(a) (providing that an unperfected securi ty interest gen era lly is 
subordinate to a subsequent judicial lien creditor). Recharacterization 1vould affect perfection with 
respect to payment intangibles and promissory notes but not accounts and chattel paper. See also in/i-a 
note 152. 
I 19. Exceptions are sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes. 
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section 1-203 follows the case law that focused on the economic 
realities of the transaction, i.e., whether the "lessee" agreed to acquire 
and pay for, and whether the "lessor" agreed to part with, essentially the 
entire economic value of the goods. The recharacterization 
methodology was not developed by examining a transaction, asking 
whether public notice by way of an Article 9 filing should be required 
for the transaction, and recharacterizing the transaction in the case of an 
affirmative answer. The filing requirement for leases recharacterized as 
SISOs was simply one of several results, albeit a very important one, 
that followed from the recharacterization. 120 
Our methodology is not only sound but also useful. For example, 
lessons from the leasing cases and literature are instructive in identifying 
the relevance, if any, of recourse to the proper characterization of a 
120. Of course, the applicab ility of the filing rules is not the only material nonbank.ruptcy effect of 
recharacterizing a lease as a SISO. Consider a nonterminab le lease of equipment valued at $ 1,000, with 
an anticipated economic life of ten years, for an initial term of three years at an annual rental of $350, 
payable monthly. The anticipated fair market value of the equipment at the end of the initial term will 
be S700. Following the initial tenn, Lessee has an option to renew annually, for an additional seven 
years, for an annual rental of $5. Assume that Lessee defaults after making the first 18 monthly rental 
payments and Lessor takes possession of the equipment. Lessor claims damages in the amount of the 
present value of the remaining (initial-term) rental payments ($525) less the present value of the market 
rent for the remaining portion of the initial term. 
If the lease is not recharacterized as a SJSO, then Article 2A would apply. Lessor would be 
entitled to retain the equipment and recover the damages claimed. See U.C.C. § 2A-528(1 ). If, 
however, the lease is recharacterized (as it should be, given the nominal renewal options that extend 
through the remain ing economic life of the equipment, see id. § 1-203(b)(3)), then Article 9, Part 6 
would apply. In the normal case, Lessor (as a secured party, in the role of either a seller of goods or a 
lender of funds) would not be entitled to retain the equipment but would be obliged to dispose of the 
collateral in a commercially reasonable manner, credit the net proceeds of disposition against Lessee's 
obli gation , and pay any surplus to Lessee. !d.§§ 9-6 10, 9-615. In effect, the failure to recharacterize 
\vould cause Lessee to forfei t the residual value, for which it bargained. 
It is inconceivable to us that a court astute enough to recognize that Lessor is not entitled to 
any meaningful residual value (i.e., would give Lessee the benefit of its bargain and limit Lessor's 
recovery to lost rent) , perhaps relying on U.C.C. § l-305(a), nevertheless would fail to recharacterize the 
lease as a SISO. The only plausible explanation for a court's failure to recharacterize the lease as a 
SISO -vvould be that the court failed to recognize the basis for recharacterization (the nom inal renewal 
options). Having fa iled to recharacterize the lease, the court wou ld apply Article 2A to the breach that 
occurred during the initial three-year term of the true lease. 
Recharacterization also may have material economic consequences even in the simple case in 
wh ich the initial term (say, ten years) of a non terminable lease is equal to the anticipated economic life 
of the goods . The actual usefu l li fe of the goods may tum out to exceed expectations, and the fair rental 
va lue of the goods at the time of Lessee's default may exceed the rent due under the lease. Suppose that 
Lessee repudiates at the end of year three and returns the equipment to Lessor. Lessor then enters into a 
substitute lease of the goods for the remaining seven years at a hi gher rent than Lessee had agreed to 
pay. The economic substance of the transaction is that Lessee bargained to become the owner of the 
goods. As such, Lessee should be entitled to credit for the entire value of the goods (as reflected by the 
present va lue of the rent payable under the substitute lease and the value, if any, of the residual), less the 
ob li gation deemed secured by the goods. Because this transaction must be recharacterized as a SISO, 
under Artic le 9 Lessee would be entitled to the present value of the rentals, to the extent that they exceed 
the secured obligation and related expenses and attorney's fees. See id. § 9-615(d)(l). 
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transaction in receivables. As we have explained, the ove:arching role 
of recourse in the case law and literature on the true sale Issue may be 
understood best from the perspective of the courts ' attempt to allocate 
and measure the benefits and burdens of ownership.12 1 Seen from that 
narrow perspective alone, the seller's retention of the credit risk of 
account debtor nonperformance seems significant, if not determinative. 
The risk of nonpayment is the principal risk of owning a receivable. 
In the lease context, however, commentators and courts have come to 
accept that a factors-type "benefits and burdens" focus on what may 
seem to be owner-type responsibilities or risks sheds little, if any, light 
on the analysis. 122 For example, placing contractual responsibility on a 
lessee for the payment of taxes, insurance, and other obligations and 
expenses relating to the leased goods has little or nothing to do with 
whether a purported lease should be recharacterized as a SIS0. 123 Much 
of the case law on recharacterizing purported leases as secured 
transactions, during the 1960s and 1970s in particular, took a factors 
approach. By the 1980s, much of the case law was appropriately 
focusing on the economic realities of the transaction and whether a 
purported lessor had effectively retained a meaningful residual interest 
at the expiration of the lease term. 124 If so, true lease treatment was 
appropriate. The more rigorous analysis in these cases was inspired in 
part by a growing and more sophisticated academic literature. 125 The 
resulting analytical structure was codified in a revised definition of 
"security interest" promulgated in 1987 along with Article 2A. 126 
The analogous case law and literature on the tme sale- SISO 1ssue, 
121. See supra Part IV .A- B. 
122. Cooper, sup ra note 65, at 201, 222, 230--3 1. 
123. /d. at 230. 
124. See U .C.C. § 1-203 cmt. 2. 
125. See, e.g., John D. Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 341 
(1983); John D. Ayer, On the Vacuity of !he Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IOWA L. R EV . 667 (1983) ; 
Amelia H. Boss, Panacea or Nightmare? Leases in Article 2, 64 B. U. L. R EV. 39 (1984) ; Amelia H. 
Boss, Leases & Sales: Ne'er or Where Shall The Twain }v/eef?, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35 7 (1 983 ); Peter F. 
Coogan, is There a Difference Belween A Long-Term Lease and an !nsta//menl Sale of Personal 
Property?, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1036 (198 1); Coogan, supra note 116; Cooper, supra note 65; Cha rl es W. 
Mooney, Jr. , Personal Property Leasing: A Challenge, 36 Bus . LAW. 1605 ( 198 1 ). 
126. U.C.C. § 1-201 (37) (1987). ln connection with the revis ion of Article I in 200 1, the 
provisions in the definition of "security interest" relating to di stinguishing leases from sec urity interests 
were moved to a new§ 1-203. U.C.C. § 1-203 (2001). Until it was revised in connec tion with the 
promulgat ion of Article 2A, the UCC 's definition of "security interest" provided, in pettinent part, 
"[u]nless a lease or consignment is intended as security, reservation of title thereunder is not a ' security 
interest ' . ... Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of eac h case .... " 
U.C.C. § 1-20 1(37) (1962). Some courts misconstrued the phrase " intended as sec urity' ' as requiring 
them to characterize the transaction as a lease or security interest in accordance with the parties' 
subjecti ve intentions as to the legal characterization. The proper approach is to detem1ine th e terms of 
the parties' agreement and then to consider the nature of the transaction as a matter of economic 
substance . See U.C.C. § I -203 cmt. 2 (referring to the "focus on economics"). 
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however, has failed to mature analytically. It generally focuses on the 
existence of recourse against the seller coupled with other factors 
claimed to represent indicia of ownership, such as whether a purported 
seller or buyer has responsibility for servicing and collecting the 
receivables. This approach fails to appreciate and rigorously analyze the 
actual economic relationships. These "factors" generally should be 
discounted and disregarded except in respect of their actual economic 
impact or as they may be useful for determining the terms of the 
relevant agreement. 
Thus we see two very different alternative approaches to comparing 
the terms of a purported sale of receivables to the characteristics of a 
SISO, particularly as regards the role of recourse. One approach, 
advocated by Pantaleo, focuses primarily on the question whether a 
seller's recourse has the attributes of a borrower's obligation to repay a 
loan. If economic recourse (as opposed to collectibility recourse) exists, 
Pantaleo would find a SISO transaction. But this emphasis on the "loan-
like" terms of a seller's recourse obligation appears to give great 
significance to the parties' subjective intentions with respect to the legal 
characterization of the transaction. Moreover, the seller's economic 
recourse, its guaranty of the buyer's yield, is offset by the price paid or 
to be paid by the buyer. Taken together, the guarantee and the price 
determine the net value that the seller will receive in exchange for the 
receivables. In our view, the nature and calculation of the net sales price 
do not provide an adequate basis for recharacterization. 
We favor a second general approach to comparing the terms of a 
purported sale transaction with the characteristics of a SISO. This 
approach recognizes that in a SISO transaction the purported seller will 
retain some economic interest in the receivables to secure an obligation 
of the purported buyer. Stated otherwise, it recognizes that in a true sale 
the buyer will have captured all of the value of the receivables, leaving 
none for the seller. But these conclusory descriptions do not alone 
provide sufficient guidance. For that reason Part V.B provides examples 
that illustrate these concepts of a retained interest and a secured 
obligation. 
As to a putative buyer's secured obligation, once again, the leasing 
cases and literature are instructive. As we explained above, a purported 
lessee's obligation is an essential element ofrecharacterizing a lease as a 
SISO transaction. 127 But the law on lease recharacterization, now 
codified, recognizes that such an obligation (as in a "full-payout" lease) 
is of itself an insufficient basis for recharacterization if the lessor in fact 
!27. See supra Part IV.A-B. 
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retains a meaningful residual interest. 128 The lessee 's obligation may 
have all the earmarks of an installment purchase price, but if the lessee 
does not acquire all of the lessor's interest, the transaction is a true lease. 
The same holds true in the receivables context. As we shall see in the 
examples that follow, a seller's recourse obligation may be an important, 
indeed necessary, element of a recharacterization, but it is not a 
sufficient basis on which to conclude that a transaction is a SIS0.129 
This is so even if a recourse obligation is accompanied in the transaction 
by various other "indicia of ownership" thought to be probative 
"factors" in the true sale analysis. This analysis reveals the flaw in 
Pantaleo's argument that a loan repayment-like recourse obligation-
economic recourse--dictates SISO treatment. A seller's recourse 
obligation in an amount equivalent to repayment of the sales price with 
interest should not dictate SISO treatment if the seller has not retained a 
meaningful economic interest in the receivables. 130 
The features of a SISO are commonly known and understood. 
Holding up a purported sale transaction against the SISO template is 
more likely to yield an appropriate result than using what one imagines 
are the characteristics of a sale as a template. Virtually all of the 
commentary on the subject recognizes that attempts to sort out whether, 
and the extent to which, the benefits and burdens of ownership have 
passed to a purported buyer are problematic at best. 13 1 
Even with the approach we advocate, distinguishing a true sale of 
receivables from a SISO may not be easy. Indeed, determining whether 
the purported seller of receivables has retained some interest in the 
receivables after sale often is more difficult than determining whether 
the purported lessor of goods has retained an interest. In lease 
transactions, the terms of the transaction documents invariably provide 
that the purported lessor retains a leasehold interest and a residual 
interest in the leased goods. The legal question is whether the economic 
nature of the retained interests is such that the law should recharacterize 
them as a security interest. In receivables transactions, however, an 
interest retained by the seller may not be expressly reflected by the 
contractual terms of the transaction documents . That is to say, the 
documentation may provide in its form and terminology for the transfer 
of all of the seller's interest and may not provide- by its terms-for the 
seller to retain any residual, reversion, or other beneficial "equity'' 
128. U.C.C . § l-203(c)(l); id. § 1-203 cmt. 2. 
129. See infra Part V.B. 
130. Of course, one can't he lp but wonder why a sophisticated seller would agree to be liable for 
an amount equivalent to the sales price plus interest without also retaining some interest in the so ld 
receivables. We di scuss thi s apparentl y implausible situation infra. 
13 l. See, e.g. , Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 516. 
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interest. But if the transfer is functionally and economically a SISO, 
then the "seller" is an Article 9 debtor who enjoys a right to redeem the 
collateral (the "sold" receivables), even if the transfer by its terms 
purports to be absolute. 
In attempting to fashion a method for distinguishing a true sale of 
receivables from a SISO, some commentators have sought guidance 
from the large body of case law that addresses the same issue with 
respect to real property, i.e., whether a deed absolute on its face should 
be recharacterized as a conveyance for security (in effect, a 
mortgage). 132 Although real property recharacterization law is not 
completely consistent, section 3.2 of the Restatement Third, Property 
(Mortgage~) is sufficient for present purposes. In setting out what the 
Repmiers describe as "the majority view that the intent of the parties, 
and not the form of the transaction, controls,"133 that section provides, in 
pertinent part: 
§ 3.2 The Absolute Deed Intended as Security 
(a) Parol evidence is admissible to establish that a deed purporting to be 
an absolute conveyance of real estate was intended to serve as 
security for an obligation, and should therefore be deemed a 
mortgage. The obligation may have been created prior to or 
contemporaneous with the conveyance and need not be the personal 
liability of any person. 
(b) Intent that the deed serve as security must be proved by clear and 
convincing evidence. Such intent may be inferred from the totality of 
the circumstances, including the following factors: 
( 1) statements of the parties; 
(2) the presence of a substantial disparity between the value received 
by the grantor and the fair market value of the real estate at the 
time of the conveyance; 
( 3) the fact that the grantor retained possession of the real estate; 
( 4) the fact that the grantor continued to pay real estate taxes; 
(5) the fact that the grantor made post-conveyance improvements to 
the real estate; and 
( 6) the nature of the parties and their relationship prior to and after the 
132. Aicher and Fellerhoff re lied on that case law to buttress their argument that the touchstone of 
the analys is should be the existence of a material disparity between the value of the receivables and the 
pri ce paid for them. Aicher & Fellerhoff, supra note 54, at 207--09 . Plank pointed out that the 
recharacterization law was well sett led in the real property context, but other than giving central 
sign ificance to a material disparity between the sales price and the value, his analys is does not apply real 
property doctrine directly. Plank, True Sale, supra note 54, at 288- 89. Kettering argued th at courts 
should be paying more attention to that law, which directly addresses the policy that recharacteri zation 
seeks to promote: insuring that the mortgagor does not forfeit any equity it may enjoy in the real 
property. Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 526-31. 
133. RESTATEJv!ENTTH!RD, PROPERTY(MORTGAG ES) § 3.2 reporters ' note ( 1997) . 
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Couched in terms of what a conveyance was "intended" to achieve 
and listing "factors" from which "intent may be inferred," section 3.2 
seems to embody the very attributes that were rejected in the UCC' s 
reformed approach toward the lease- security interest dichotomy. 
Properly understood, however, there is no contradiction. The 
Restatement rule faithfully reflects the language used by courts over 
many years. 135 But the comments suggest that the point of the exercise 
is to ascertain the terms of the agreement between the parties, i.e ., what 
the parties intended the deal between them to be. Recharacterization 
requires terms that amount to a mortgage securing an obligation. For 
example, was it the deal that the recipient of the conveyance would 
reconvey the property to the transferor upon satisfaction of an obligation 
owed by the transferor? Or, was the agreement the economic equivalent 
of such a deal? In either case the transaction is for security and should 
be recharacterized as a mortgage. If not, then the absolute conveyance 
should stand. 136 
134. !d. For Kettering's discuss ion of recharacterization in thi s setting, including under the 
Restatement, see Kettering, Tme Sale, supra note 26, at 527-31. Restatement section 3.3 IS 
substanti ally similar. As exp lained in comment a: 
Section 3.2 deals with situations in which parol evidence is used to establish that an absolute 
deed was intended as security for an obligation, or in which the security intent is reflected in a 
separate writing. The present section deals with absolute deed transactions in which there is a 
second written document that purports to confer on the grantor either the option (Illustrations 1-3 
and 5-6) or the contractual obligation (Illustration 4) to purchase the property described in the 
deed. This type of transaction is often referred to as a conditional sale. 
RESTATEMENT THIRD, PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 3.3 cmt. a. 
135. Recall that, un ti l the promulgation of Article 2A, the UCC used the phrase "intended as 
security" with respect to the recharacteriza tion of a true lease. See supra note 125. The phrase also 
appeared in Former Article 9. U.C.C. §§ 9-1 02(2), 9-408 (1962). 
136. Kettering 's perspective is consistent with this characterization: 
[T]he Restatement glosses [the rule in section 3.3, which contemplates recharacterizati on when 
an absolute conveyance was intended by the parties as sec urity] in a way that implements the 
ant i forfeiture principle . ... That is, the sa le will be recharacterized if the transaction amounts to 
imposition of a forfeiture upon the grantor in the event that the grantor fai ls in a contemplated 
performance. Specitlcally, if the economic terrns of the transaction are such as to make it c lear 
at the outset that the grantor will repurchase the property if he is able to do so, then th e sa le will 
be recharacterized, for the grantor suffers the economic equivalent of strict foreclosure by not 
carrying out the contemplated repurchase . 
Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 529- 30. These observations apply equally to the rule 
in section 3.2. 
We recognize that not everyone agrees with the Restatement's gloss. See. e.g., Marshall E. 
Tracht, Leasehold Recharacterization in Bankruptcy: A Review and Critique (N.Y. Law Sch. Legal 
Stud. Res. Paper No. 12/ 13 #42), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=2097 1 05 (finding merit in the 
cases that characterize a transaction in accordance with the subjecti ve intent of the parti es as to the lega l 
etTect or form of their transaction and crit icizing those that adopt the "economic reality" approach). 
Under the UCC, however, " [t]he subjective intention of the parties with respect to the legal 
characterization of their transaction is irrelevant" to whether a transaction gives rise to a "security 
interest" governed by Art icle 9. U.C.C. § 9-1 09 cmt. 2. 
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The factors usefully come into play when the evidence is conflicting 
as to the tenns of the parties' agreement. Consider section 3.2, 
illustration 3: 
3. Grantor conveys Blackacre to Grantee by a deed that contains no 
language of defeasance. Grantee pays Grantor $25,000 in cash, but 
Grantor does not deliver a promissory note to Grantee. Grantor testifies 
that Grantee promised orally to reconvey Blackacre to grantor upon the 
latter's payment of $35,000 to Grantee two years thereafter. Grantee 
denies making such an oral promise and contends that the transaction 
constitutes a sale of Blackacre to Grantee. Grantor has retained 
possession and has continued to pay the real estate taxes on Blackacre. 
At the time of the conveyance the fair market value of Blackacre is 
$50,000. The facts justify the conclusion that the parties intended a 
. . 13'1 
secunty transactiOn. 
The factors in illustration 3- the disparity between the consideration 
paid and value of the property conveyed and the grantor's continued 
possession and payment of real estate taxes- provide cogent evidence 
of whose testimony should be believed. In illustration 3, these factors 
make the grantor's story credible, and when the grantee's obligation to 
reconvey becomes a term of the parties' agreement, the economic 
substance of the transaction becomes a SISO. 
Now suppose that the grantor is deceased and the only direct evidence 
of the parties' agreement is the grantee's testimony that the parties 
agreed to a sale with no promise of reconveyance. Consider 
Restatement section 3 .2, illustration 5: 
5. Grantor conveys Blackacre to Grantee by a deed that contains no 
language of defeasance. Grantee pays Grantor $25,000 in cash, but 
Grantor does not deliver a promissory note to Grantee. Grantor retains 
possession, pays the real estate taxes and builds a garage on the premises. 
The fair market value of B lackacre at the time of the conveyance is 
$50,000. Grantor dies a year after the conveyance and, other than 
Grantee, no one else can testify as to what was said at the time the deed 
was delivered. Grantee testifies that the parties intended an absolute sale 
of Blackacre. Nevertheless, the facts justify the conclusion that the 
parties intended a security transaction. 138 
In addition to the factors specified in illustration 3 (Grantor's retention 
of possession and payment of real estate taxes), in illustration 5 the 
deceased grantor had built a garage on the property following the 
conveyance. Inasmuch as there can be no mortgage without an 
obligation that is secured, the fact that there is no direct evidence that 
13 7. RESTAT EMENT THIRD, PROPERTY (MORTGAGES)§ 3.2 cmt. e, illus. 3. 
!38. !d.§ 3.2 cmt. e, illus. 5. 
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(deceased) Grantor was entitled to a reconveyance upon discharge of a 
specified obligation is problematic. The comments indicate, however, 
that "it is unnecessary to establish either the existence of a promissory 
note or similar written evidence of the debt or that the grantor is 
personally liable to repay it. Rather a court may impute the existence of 
the debt where the totality of the facts indicate that a security transaction 
was intended." 139 In illustration 5, the factors strongly suggest the 
transaction was for security and appear sufficient to permit the trier of 
fact to disbelieve Grantee's testimony. After all, why else would 
Grantor have conveyed property in exchange for half its fair market 
value, remained in possession rent-free, paid real estate taxes, and built a 
garage? 140 
For the most part the types of "factors" that attend a purported sale of 
receivables, including any recourse against the seller, lack the 
meaningful economic impact of the factors involved in illustration 5, 
such as rent-free retention of possession, payment of taxes, and 
construction of a new building on the property. Absent express terms 
providing that the "seller" will share in the value of the "sold" 
receivables, the most significant factor that may be seen in a receivables 
transaction is a disparity between the price paid and the value of the 
receivables. In connection with Example 5, below, we address the 
question whether such a price-value disparity alone could be an 
adequate basis for recharacterization of a purported sale of 
receivables. 141 We conclude that it should not be. 
B. Illustrative Examples 
The following examples illustrate how our approach to 
recharacterization might be applied. Example 1 is a transaction facially 
structured as (i.e., using the terminology of) a sale of receivables, but its 
terms mirror as closely as possible a SISO transaction. 
139. !d. § 3.2 cmt. e. 
140. As comment e suggests, had Grantor and Grantee been party to a long-term lease of the 
property in question, the inference that the absolute deed was in fact for sec urity wou ld have been 
significantly weaker. !d. Regardless, inferring an obligation gives rise to a host of operational 
problems. What would be the amount of the secured obligation and when would it be due'? Pres umably 
a court would conc lude that the implicit (or explicit) agreement must have been that th e $25,000 paid by 
Grantee was the principal amount, that Grantor would pay interest at a "reasonable'· rate (such as a 
statutory rate of interest), and that the principal and interest would be due at a "reasonab le" time. Cf 
U.C. C. § 2-305 (if the price is an open term in a contract for sale of goods then the price wil l be a 
"reasonable price") ; id. § 2-309 (if the time for shipment or delivery is not spec ified in a contract for 
sa le of goods then the time will be a "reasonable time"). And assuming a judicial determination 
consistent with the result in illustration 5, what wou ld Grantee then be required to plead and prove in 
order to foreclose its "mortgage"? 
141. See inji-a Part V.B (Example 5). 
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Example 1: 
Seller (S) agrees to sell and Buyer (B) agrees to buy specified receivables 
for a purchase price equal to ninety percent of the present value of the 
receivables (assuming payment by the account debtors when due) . The 
present value is calculated at a market discount rate, which takes into 
account the time value of money and the risk of account debtor default, so 
that the price roughly equals ninety percent of the fair market value of the 
receivables. 142 B has full recourse against S arising out of an account 
debtor 's default: If any receivable is not paid when due, Sis obligated to 
repurchase the receivable for an amount equal to the account debtor's 
payment obligation. If S fails to pay any repurchase obligation, S is 
obligated to pay interest on the amount due at a specified rate per annum. 
Notwithstanding S's full recourse repurchase obligation, B's aggregate 
recovery from the receivables and S's repurchase payments (S's 
maximum obligation) is capped at ninety percent of the face amount of 
the receivables (the original purchase price plus imputed interest) . B is 
obligated to remit to S the amount of any recovery exceeding this cap. In 
addition, S has an option to repurchase the receivables at any time for the 
repurchase price of ninety percent of the face amount of the receivables 
(adjusted to present value if the repurchase occurs before the receivable 
due date). 
As a matter of economic substance and legal obligation, Example 1 is 
equivalent to a loan. B's interest in the receivables is a SISO, and 
Article 9 applies as it would to any loan secured by receivables. The 
principal amount of the loan is equal to the purchase price of the 
receivables advanced by B to S (ninety percent of the present value of 
the receivables). The principal becomes due, along with imputed 
interest, as the receivables become due. The principal (the purchase 
price) bears interest in an amount equal to the difference between the 
principal amount and ninety percent of the face amount of the 
receivables. S' s recourse obligation, as limited by the ninety percent 
cap, constitutes the obligation secured by the security interest in the 
receivables . To the extent that S's obligation to repay the principal and 
interest is not satisfied by collection of the receivables, Sis liable for the 
difference. If S fails to make a required principal payment (the 
repurchase price due on an account debtor default) , that payment bears 
interest at an agreed default rate. In effect, the parties have agreed that 
the manner of repayment in the ordinary course will be B's receipt of 
collections on receivables when due, but this feature does not affect the 
142. The ri sk premium reflects the risk that the receivable may not be collected in full from the 
account debtor or from Sunder the full recourse arrangement and consequently that the recei vables may 
be less va luable than the present value of the amounts payab le. ln the real world there could be a furth er 
haircut or "holdback'' so that B would pay less up front and thereby maintain a greater cushion of 
receivab les value over the amount advanced to S. 
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nature of the payments to B as repayments of principal and payments of 
interest. 
Note the significance of the cap on S's obligation (and B's recoveries) 
and of S's repurchase option: because B will not be entitled to collect 
and retain the full face amount of the receivables, S has retained an 
economic interest in them. By analogy to a leasing transaction, S has a 
meaningful residual interest in the receivables, just as a true lessor has a 
residual interest in leased goods, and B has not captured the entire 
economic value of the receivables, just as a true lessee has only a 
leasehold interest in leased goods. It follows that the transaction is not a 
true sale to B. And because S has the right to recover the interest 
transferred by paying a noncancellable obligation, the transaction is a 
SISO. 143 Note that the interest in the receivables retained by S sufficient 
to obviate true sale treatment need not be based on an explicit 
contractual retention of an in rem right or interest but may be the 
economic equivalent. 
In Kettering's view, the law should respect the true-sale 
characterization chosen by the parties unless recharacterization is 
necessary to prevent the purported seller from suffering a forfeiture for 
failing to make a contemplated performance.144 In Example 1, however, 
the terms of the parties' agreement appear to afford the "seller" the 
antiforfeiture protection afforded to a debtor under a SISO. Resort to 
Article 9' s antiforfeiture provisions would not be necessary. Under 
Kettering's purposive approach, then, the transaction in Example 1 
would stand as a true sale. 145 If the law were to treat Example 1 as a 
true sale, however, then any typical loan secured by receivables could be 
stmctured as a true sale without there being any meaningful difference 
in the economic substance of the transaction or the contractual 
obligations of the parties. Kettering acknowledges that the 
recharacte1ization of a true sale of receivables may bring about 
consequences unrelated to the risk of forfeiture , but he deems them 
insufficient to warrant a standard for recharacterization other than the 
prevention of forfeiture .146 We think the stakes are higher. 
Suppose that the receivables in Example 1 were payment intangibles 
and that B did not file a financing statement covering them. If the form 
of the transaction is respected, then B's security interest would be 
perfected; recharacterization, however, would result in B's security 
143. Thi s aspect of the transaction is explored again in connection with Example 3, infra. 
144. Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26 , at 539 ("[T]here is nothing in the structure of Article 9 
that prov ides a good reason for recharacterization o f a sale of receivables to be governed by a standard 
different from the antiforfeiture principle from which the doctrine evolved."). 
145. U. C.C. § 9-607(c). 
146. See Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 533-39. 
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interest being unperfected and thus vulnerable to the claims of 
competing creditors and subsequent buyers. 147 This is because a true 
sale of payment intangibles is perfected automatically, but perfection of 
a SISO in payment intangibles requires the giving of public notice by 
filing a financing statement. 148 
Kettering would allow the parties to a transaction that is the economic 
equivalent of a SISO in payment intangibles to avoid the consequences 
of the failure to give public notice of the resulting security interest by 
structuring the transaction as a true sale. In his view, the Article 9 
policy of requiring public notice of SISOs is not an appropriate basis on 
which to recharacterize what the parties have documented as a true sale. 
He writes: 
It would be specious to contend that recharacterization analysis should be 
altered as a result of the rule affording automatic perfection to sales of 
payment intangibles and promissory notes, on the theory that the public 
notice afforded by compliance with the ordinary perfection requirements 
of Article 9, required in the case of a secured loan, is so desirable as to 
weigh in favor of a low standard for recharacterizing such sales as 
secured loans. 149 
Note that Kettering's claim follows directly from his own proposed 
analysis but would make no sense under our analysis, the analyses in the 
case law, or those offered by earlier commentators. Kettering's analysis 
tailors the recharacterization doctrine as may be necessary to promote a 
specific purpose. If there is more than one purpose to be served by 
recharacterization, then different standards for recharacterization may 
arise with respect to a single transaction. Having identified one purpose 
that justifies recharacterization, i.e., to prevent forfeiture, the 
identification of a second purpose, i.e., to promote Article 9's policy of 
requiring public notice of SISOs, would require that the standard for 
recharacterization be "altered" and, at least in the case under discussion, 
"lower[ ed]."150 Such an alteration apparently would be justified only if 
147. An unperfected security interest generally is junior to the rights of lien creditors and holders 
of perfected security interests. U.C.C. § 9-317(a) (lien creditors); id. § 9-322(a)(2) (security interests). 
148. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (providing the general rule that a financing statement must be filed to 
perfect a security interest) ; id. § 9-31 O(b )(2) (providing that a security interest that is perfected when it 
attaches is an exception to the genera l rule); id. § 9-309(3) (providing that a sale of a payment intangible 
is perfected when it attaches). Likewise, a sale of promissory notes is perfected automatically but a 
SlSO is not. See id. § 9-309(4) (providing that a sale of a promissory note is perfected when it attaches). 
But see id. § 9-312(e) (providing for temporary perfection of a security interest in instruments that arises 
for new va lue under an authenticated security agreement). For convenience, the discussion in the text 
refers only to payment intangibles. 
149. Kettering, T111e Sale, supra note 26, at 538. 
150. !d. at 538. 
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it yielded an outcome that is particularly "desirable."151 Article 9's 
perfection policy, at least in this case, does not meet that test. 152 
Moreover, "[ e ]ven if the public notice afforded by filing were thought 
desirable, lowering the standard for recharacterization would be a 
terrible way to induce more filings, for no standard for 
recharacterization follows from such a purpose; the result would be 
arbitrary and unpredictable."153 Finally, recharacterization of a 
transaction in order to promote the perfection policy might result in 
application of the antiforefeiture provisions, even when the seller 
retained no otherwise protectable interest in the receivables. 154 
Unlike Kettering, we think the transaction in Example 1 should be 
recharacterized as a SISO for purposes of Article 9, even if the only 
legal consequence of recharacterization would be the loss of 
perfection. 155 We recognize that the "automatic perfection" rule for 
sales of payment intangibles does not follow from the inherent economic 
differences between the two transactions. 156 But we think it would be a 
mistake to construe the reference in section 9-309(3) to "a sale of a 
payment intangible" to include a transaction, like Example 1, that is the 
economic equivalent of a SISO. When it comes to characterizing a 
transaction as a SISO, the UCC elevates substance over form. 157 Even 
though the courts have not adopted a clear rule for distinguishing true 
sales from SISOs, the "sale-distinguishing" rules of Revised Article 9 
were written on the understanding that there is a real economic 
difference between the two transactions. We think that all the sale-
related provisions of Article 9-not just the antiforfeiture provisions-
should be construed to reflect that difierence. We do not advocate for 
an "altered" recharacterization test but seek to identify and justifY what 
is and should be the appropriate test. 
Under our analysis, one need not inquire into the strength of the 
policy requiring public notice for security transfers (SISOs) of payment 
intangibles. Regardless of whether the original decision to subject true 
sales of cetiain receivables to the perfection and priority rules of Article 
9 (including the general rule that a financing statement must be filed in 
order to perfect) reflects the difficulty of distinguishing a true sale from 
151. !d. 
152. Kettering supports his claim that promotion of the perfection policy is not "so desirable" in 
the setting under consideration by observing that even before Revised Article 9 introduced the 
"automatic perfection"' rule, a buyer of payment intangibles may have needed to take steps to protect 
itself against the claims of third parties. !d. 
153. !d. 
154. !d. 
155. But there are other consequences outside of bankruptcy. See supra Part III. 
156. !d. 
157. !d. 
2014] WHEN Is A DOG'S T AIL NOT A LEG? 1067 
a SIS0 158 or was "the result of an historical accident that had nothing to 
do" with the difficulty of drawing such a distinction, 159 and regardless of 
whether one thinks the policy is beneficial160 or is of "questionable 
utility," 161 the sponsors reaffirmed this decision when they expanded the 
application of the general rule to sales of receivables that were 
previously outside the scope of Article 9. 162 The fact that the drafters 
advertently applied the ordinary perfection rules to SISOs in payment 
intangibles is reason enough for courts to determine-as they must do 
when considering a purported lease of goods-whether a purported sale 
should be recharacterized as a SISO. 
The failure to recharacterize the putative sale in Example 1 also 
would deprive the seller (debtor) of the benefit of nonwaivable rights 
and duties provided by Article 9. 163 Moreover, the rights of third parties 
also would be compromised. True sale treatment would mean that 
future creditors, secured and unsecured, could not reach the receivables 
that otherwise would be available to them were the transaction 
recharacterized as a SIS0. 164 Although these consequences have 
nothing to do with the antiforfeiture principle, that fact would not 
ameliorate the adverse impact for those who would be aggrieved by the 
failure to recharacterize the transaction in Example 1. 
Finally, recharacterization of a putative sale as a SISO under 
158. See U.C.C. § 9-102 cmt. (1972) ("[C]ertain sales of accounts and chattel paper are brought 
within this Article to avoid di fficu lt problems of distingui shing between transacti ons intended for 
sec urity and those not so intended."). 
159. Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 515. For a detailed description of the hi storical 
background leading to the inclusion of true sales of receivables in the Article 9 filing system, see 
Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale ofAccozmts and Chattel Paper under the 
U. C. C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting Principle, 26 CONN. L. R EV. 397, 413-25, 
436--39 ( 1994). 
160. This is Professor Shu pack's view. 
Art icle 9 provides a second benefit to buyers of payment streams within its scope. If these 
transactions are within Arti c le 9, the order of filing under Artic le 9 determines priority among 
competing buyers of the same intangible asset. There can be no equivalent certainty of 
ownership and priority of rights with respect to sold payment streams that are not subject to 
Article 9. 
Shupack, supra note 28, at 169. 
161. Plank, supra note 46, at 471 (citing Plank, Assignment of Receivables Under Article 9: 
Strucl!iral Incoherence and Wasteful Filing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 249-62 (2007)). 
162 . See supra notes 27- 30. 
163. U.C.C. § 9-2 10(b) (rights to receive a response to requests for an accounting, regarding a list 
of collateral, and regarding a statement of account); id. § 9-608(a) (appli cation of proceeds of collection 
and enforcement). Because the buyer (secured party) in Example 1 is entitled to recourse aga inst the 
seller (debtor), however, the buyer would be required to coll ect and enforce the receivab les in a 
commercially reasonable manner even if the transaction were characterized as a true sale. Jd. §S 9-
60 I (g), 9-607(c). 
164. U.C.C. § 9-3! 8(a) (seller of receivables retains no lega l or equitable interest in th e collateral 
sold). 
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nonbankruptcy law would have significant consequences in the 
bankruptcy proceeding of the seller (debtor). Specifically, the seller's 
interest in the receivables would become property of the estate, and the 
buyer would be stayed from collecting the receivables. 165 As we have 
already observed, unless a federal interest requires a different result, 
bankruptcy law respects nonbankruptcy property interests that are 
defined by state law. 166 We see no federal interest that would justify 
recharacterizing in bankruptcy a transaction that is a SISO under 
nonbankruptcy law, and we are not aware of anyone who has taken the 
position that a SISO under nonbankruptcy law would not or should not 
be treated as such in bankruptcy. 167 In our view this demonstrates why 
the transaction in Example 1 should be recharacterized under 
nonbankruptcy law even though the antiforfeiture principle is not 
compromised. 
Adoption of the single standard for recharacterization we advocate, 
i.e., whether a transaction is the functional and economic equivalent of a 
SISO, would render irrelevant Kettering's concerns about the risk of 
multiple recharacterization standards and about the uncertainly that 
might follow from a standard designed solely to promote Article 9's 
notice-filing policy. Our property-based standard also would eliminate 
any risk of imposing the antiforfeiture rules inappropriately. The 
antiforfeiture rules would apply only when the "seller" retains an 
interest in the "sold" receivables that is the functional and economic 
equivalent of a SISO, as is the case in Example 1. We tum now to 
Example 2, which significantly alters the facts of Example 1. 
Example 2: 
Example 2 differs from Example 1 in four respects. First, the purchase 
price is a fraction of the face amount of the receivables that approximates 
the fair market value of the receivables. Second, S has no recourse 
obligation to repurchase receivables in the event of account debtor 
defaults, i.e., B has assumed the entire credit !"isk of account debtor 
nonpayment. Third, S does not have an option to repurchase receivables 
at ninety percent of the face amount. Finally, B's recoveries from the 
receivables are not capped at ninety percent ofthe face value. 
165. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(l) (2012) (providing that the estate includes "all legal or equitable 
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case"); id. § 362(a)(3) (proh ibiting the 
taking of "any ac t to obtain possession of property of the estate ... or to exercise control over property 
of the estate"); id. § 362(a)(4) (prohibiting the taking of"any act to ... enforce any lien against property 
of the estate"). 
166. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
167 . Kettering has argued the converse, i.e., that "there are excellent reasons why a court so 
inclined could conc lude that a sale of receivables in a securitization transaction is not a true sale for 
bankruptcy pwposes even though it is a tme sale under nonban/..Tuptcy law." Kettering, True Sale, 
supra note 26, at 513 (emphasis added). We reserve for another day our response in oppos ition to his 
argument. 
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We see no basis for recharacterizing the Example 2 transaction as a 
SISO. By definition, a secured obligation is an essential element of a 
SIS0. 168 That element, which is present in Example 1, is completely 
lacking in Example 2. 169 Moreover, the absence of S's repurchase 
option and the absence of the cap on B's recoveries underscore the fact 
that S has retained no meaningful interest in the receivables sold to B 
and that B has captured the entire economic value of the receivables. 
Examples 1 and 2 make clear that the presence of a purported seller's 
recourse obligation may be a key element in recharacterizing a 
purported sale as a SISO. To be sure, the absence of a conventional 
recourse obligation may not ensure true sale treatment. 170 Likewise, the 
existence of recourse does not always dictate SISO treatment. 171 But 
Kettering ' s claim that the existence of a seller-recourse obligation is 
irrelevant to the true sale issue and that such recourse is like any other 
form of warranty of quality cannot stand. 172 We do not disagree that an 
element of credit recourse is analogous to a warranty of quality, but in a 
purported sale of receivables transaction it may have additional 
significance. 
Next consider Example 3. 
Example 3: 
Like Example 1 (a SISO), but unlike Example 2 (a true sale), S has a full 
recourse repurchase obligation in case of account debtor defaults. 
However, unlike Example 1 but like Example 2, S does not have an 
option to repurchase receivables at ninety percent of the face amount, and 
S' s maximum obligation (i.e., B' s aggregate recovery from the 
receivables and S's repurchase payments) is not capped at ninety percent 
of the face amount of the receivables. 
Does the elimination of S' s option to repurchase and the elimination 
of the cap on S' s obligation affect the characterization of the transaction 
as a SISO? Because Example 3 retains Example 1 's full recourse 
repurchase obligation on S but eliminates the cap on S's liability, S has 
\ 68. U.C. C. § l-20l (b)(35) ('" Security interest ' means an interest in personal property or fi xtures 
whi ch secures payment or performance of an obligation."). 
169. Return again to the leasing analogy and reca ll the importance of identify ing the obli gation 
sec ured as an essential element of a SISO. See supra note 11 6. The familiar Articl e 9 concepts of 
default and calculation of surplus and defi ciency simply do not fit the transaction in Exa mple 2. 
170. See the discussi on of Example 4 infi"a. 
17 1. See the di scussion of Example 3 infra. 
172. See Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 539 ("Recourse to the sell er is irre levant to 
rec haracterizati on, for the existence of recourse has nothi ng to do with the exis tence of a potential 
fo rfe iture to the seller in the event of the se ller 's fa ilure to perfonn as contemplated, and it is the latter 
that is the concern of the recharacterization doctrine."); id. at 543 ("A buyer of a receivab le who obtains 
from th e se ller a warranty of its timely collect ibility is in the same position as the buyer of the motor. "). 
As discussed in conn ection with Example 3, however, we agree wi th Kettering's principa l argument, our 
differences with his " irre levance" claim notwithstanding. 
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assumed even greater responsibility for account debtor performance. By 
the conventional wisdom of measuring and weighing benefits and 
burdens of ownership, S' s greater responsibility makes Example 3 seem 
even less like a true sale (and more like a SISO) than Example l. But 
we believe that the transaction in Example 3 should be afforded true sale 
treatment notwithstanding S's full recourse obligation. 
Both Example 1 and Example 3 allow B to collect from the account 
debtors and from S. As we discussed, in Example 1 B is not entitled to 
retain the full face amount of the receivables. Once B collects an 
amount equal to the cap on B's recovery, S is entitled to any excess 
value of the receivables. Moreover, S can realize any excess value by 
exercising the option to repurchase a receivable for an amount less than 
its face amount and then collecting the entire face amount from the 
account debtor. 173 Because S retained an interest in the receivables, the 
transaction in Example 1 was not a true sale. In Example 3, however, 
B's recovery is not capped. B is entitled to collect the full face amount 
from the account debtors or, if they default, from S. S's position is also 
different in the two examples. In each, S may become entitled to collect 
from the account debtors, butS's recovery in Example 3 is limited to the 
amount of the repurchase price that Spaid to B. Thus Swill obtain from 
the transaction no more than the purchase price that B paid S. And 
because S has no option to repurchase, S has no right to reacquire any 
receivables that become more valuable than the repurchase price. In 
short, unlike in Example 1, S has retained no economic interest in the 
receivables. Thus, one of the essential characteristics of a SISO is 
missing in Example 3. 
Of course, in one sense S does have an economic stake in the 
receivables in Example 3: collections by B from the account debtors 
reduce the exposure of Sunder its recourse repurchase obligations. But 
this stake arises from the fact that Sis a surety on the receivables; it is 
not the economic (typically, ownership) interest of a debtor in a SISO. 
Any relevant duties in this respect owed to S, as surety, by B, as creditor, 
would be governed by the law of suretyship and not by Article 9. 
Example 3 is a simplified version of the full recourse transactions 
addressed in Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 174 
perhaps the most commonly cited authority for recharacterizing a 
purported sale as a SISO based on recourse against the seller for account 
173. Changes in market interest rates might make it advantageous for S to borrow e lsewhere at a 
lower cost and use the funds to exercise its repurchase opti on (i.e., to prepay the secured loan). In the 
economic and pricing stm cture of Examples I and 2 it is unlikely that a receivable \Vould have a value 
materially greater than the repurchase obligation, but in other stmctures a greater disparity might exist. 
In circumstances in which it makes economic sense for S to repurchase, presumably S would repurchase 
all of the receivables. 
174. 602 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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debtor defaults. We think that Major's was wrongly decided- full 
recourse against the seller notwithstanding- because the buyer was 
entitled to all collections of the receivables (albeit supported by the 
seller ' s recourse obligations) and the seller retained no interest. 175 We 
believe that Kettering's analysis is correct. The only value associated 
with the receivables arises from collections from the account debtors. In 
Example 3, B is entitled to all of the collections with none of that value 
being retained by or returned to S. B is entitled to the entire value ; 
consequently, the transaction is a true sale. 
We suspect that some may find our conclusion to be counterintuitive. 
One arguably problematic aspect of the analysis relates to the fact that, 
in a SISO (such as in Example 1), the debtor's predefault waiver of its 
right to redeem the receivables would not be enforceable. 176 It might 
seem ironic that simply striking out the contract provisions that give rise 
to that right- the repurchase option and the cap on liability-effectively 
eliminates the otherwise nonwaivable right. On reflection, however, the 
irony must give way. The exercise here is to fathom whether the 
purported seller has sold everything; an agreement that results in the 
seller retaining nothing demonstrates that the seller has in fact done so. 
Given that in a SISO transaction the right of redemption is statutory 
and need not be preserved or provided for by contract, 177 it may seem 
odd that the contractual provisions present in Example 1 but missing in 
Example 3 play such a pivotal role. But all one can glean from this is 
that the absence of an express redemption right does not preclude 
recharacterization of a purported true sale as a SISO. Indeed, a typical 
secured loan (not dressed in a sale's clothing) does not expressly 
provide for a right of redemption, yet normally the question would not 
even arise as to whether the transaction was a SISO or whether the 
debtor had a redemption right. Thus, although the presence of an 
express redemption right is relevant to characterization, its absence is 
not. When in substance a seller conveys its entire interest in a 
receivable, the seller retains no interest that can be foreclosed and so 
. . h d 178 enJoys no ng t tore eem. 
l 75. Kettering reaches the same conclusion, but his analysis differs somewhat. We think the 
tran saction in Major's is a true sale because the seller reta ined no in terest in the receivables. Kettering 
thinks that the transaction is a true sale because there is no risk that the seller would forfeit any interest 
in the col lec tions as a result of any default-like event on its part . See Kettering, Tn~e Sale, supra note 
26, at 541 (criticizing the holding in Major's Furniture Mart, In c. v. Castle Credit Corp. , 602 F.2d 538 
(3d Cir. 1979)) . Of course, the reason the seller would not forfeit an interest in the collections is that the 
seller retained no such interes t. 
176 . U.C.C. § 9-602( 11 ). 
I 77. !d. § 9-623 . 
l 78 . As Kettering noted: 
The nonwaivable equity of redemption embedded in Artic le 9. and the recharacterization 
1072 U NIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW RE VIEW [VOL. 82 
We concluded that S retained no interest in the receivables because B 
was entitled to all of the collections on the receivables. Because of S's 
recourse obligation, however, B does have an economic stake in B 's 
collections on the receivables: every dollar collected reduces B's 
contingent, secondary obligation. But the question is whether the 
interest transferred to B is a SISO, with the result that B would have 
obtained only a security interest instead of full ownership and S would 
have retained an interest. That S has a recourse obligation cannot 
determine whether S has retained an interest. An obligation on a 
receivable, including a secondary obligation, does not constitute or 
evidence a property interest in the receivable itself. 179 A surety for an 
obligation acquires no interest in the obligation until and unless it 
acquires such an interest such as by assignment or through 
subrogation. 180 
As we have acknowledged above, we are mindful that the analysis of 
a transaction against the template of a SISO will not always be 
straightforward or easy. More complicated transactional structures may 
yield less clear conclusions than the simple examples discussed here . 
But when the facts are messy, it is particularly useful to know what one 
is looking for. The object of the investigation should be the existence, 
or not, of an obligation of the purported seller that is secured by the 
receivables transferred to the buyer, as evidenced by an economic 
interest or benefit that is retained by the purported seller. The specific 
terms of the parties' agreement are relevant only insofar as they relate to 
the existence, or not, of such an interest and such an obligation. But a 
putative seller's recourse obligation does not reflect a property interest 
in the assigned receivables. 
Next consider Example 4. 
Example 4: 
Example 4 includes several significant variations from Example 1. The 
purchase price paid by B to S is about half of the fa ir market va lue of the 
receivables. S' s repurchase-option price is equal to the orig inal purchase 
price paid by B with two adjustments: a downward adjustment to take 
account of amounts collected from account debtors and paid to B and an 
upward adjustment to compensate B for the time value of money 
(imputed interest) to the extent not re±1ected in the purchase price. S's 
doctrine that defends it, overrides freedom of contract to the extent of preventing a party from 
enforceab ly agreeing to the economic equivalent of a strict foreclosure in the event that the pa11y 
fa ils to carry out a contemplated performance. It is not a general lmrrantfo;· relieving a par(v 
ji-om the consequences of selling on hard terms. 
Kettering, True Sale, supra note 26, at 541 (emphasis added). 
179. See supra Part IV .A- B. 
180 . However, in a proper case (such as in Example I) a recourse obligati on may const itute th e 
obligation secured by the ass igned receivables. 
I 
i 
I 
l 
l 
I 
I 
I 
' 
' > 
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repurchase option expires six months after the transaction date. The 
receivables are payable by account debtors in monthly installments over a 
period of years. As in Example 2, S has no recourse obligation. 
One might conclude that the transaction in Example 4 cannot be a 
SISO because there is no obligation secured. The purchase option is just 
that, an option. S has no enforceable contractual obligation to 
repurchase the receivables. Yet Example 4 is a classic example of a sale 
that is absolute in form but which would be recharacterized as a secured 
loan. 181 By failing to exercise the option, S would forfeit half the value 
of the receivables. For this reason, one can be confident that Sis just as 
likely to exercise the option as S would be to fulfill a contractual 
obligation to repurchase. Thus the repurchase-option price in Example 
4 is a secured obligation, even though it is an obligation based on 
economic compulsion and not on a contractual undertaking. 182 As S is 
the debtor in a SISO transaction, Article 9 will protect S' s economic 
interest in the receivables, including its equity of redemption, if S is 
unable to pay the repurchase-option price before the option expires by 
its terms (i.e., if Sis unable to satisfy the secured obligation when due). 
The analysis here is essentially the same as with a bargain or nominal 
purchase option in favor of a lessee of goods upon expiration of the 
lease term : the bargain option economically compels the lessee to 
exercise it. 183 
It is fundamental that the identification of a secured obligation is a 
necessary and useful analytical approach to the true sale versus SISO 
dichotomy. The bargain option price also demonstrates that S has 
retained a meaningful economic interest in the receivables (i.e., that B 
has not acquired their entire value) and that, accordingly, true sale 
treatment would not be appropriate. This is true even though, as in 
Example 4, the parties ' agreement does not expressly provide B with a 
right of redemption or a residual interest. The bargain repurchase option 
is the practical economic surrogate for such an express provision and so 
constitutes the secured obligation. 
181. See supra note 13 7 and accompanying text. 
182. We make thi s point with a problem in our casebook in volving a recharacteri zed lease under 
which a purchase option price is properly treated as a part of the secured obligation. HARR IS & 
MOONEY, supra note 116, at 319 (Problem 5. 1.3 ). A thi rd party might attack the sale as a constructi ve 
fraudul ent tran sfer. Assumin g that B acted in good faith, B would be entitled to a credi t or li en for the 
va lue it advanced. See, e.g., UN!F. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 8(d) (1984). Avoidance and 
recharacterization thus would yield the same result, or at least a similar one. Kettering claims that our 
position- that a secured obligation is necessary for recharacterization- is circu lar because 
" recharacterization itse lf can create the secured obligation" and he points to our analysis o f Example 4 
as a case in point. Kettering Memorandum, supra note 48, at 6. But he misconstntes our position , 
which is that the tenn s of a transac tion must prov ide a basis for determining that there is an obligat ion 
secured. As stated in the text, it need not be an exp licit and enforceable contrac tua l obligation. 
183. See U.C.C. § l-203(b)(4) (purchase option for no or nomina l cons ideration). 
1074 UN! VERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW 
Consider next Example 5. 
Example 5: 
[VOL. 82 
Example 5 makes only one variation from Example 4. It eliminates S's 
option to repurchase the receivables . 
In Example 4 S' s bargain repurchase option was the linchpin of the 
SISO analysis. It provided the obligation that was secured and the 
means by which S retained an interest in the receivables. Because 
Example 5 removes this repurchase option, we believe that the transfer 
of receivables is a true sale. 
Contrary to the position of Aicher and Fellerhoff, 184 in our view a 
disparity between the sales price and the value of the receivables being 
sold should not be sufficient of itself for recharacterization of the 
transaction as a SISO. Nor do we believe that such a disparity should be 
given a prominent role, as Plank proposed. 185 The attention to disparity 
between price and value is grounded on the idea that rational actors 
normally do not sell property for much less than its value, while 
borrowers that provide collateral typically provide collateral of a value 
in excess of their secured obligation. A substantial disparity arguably 
indicates that even though neither the transaction documents nor the 
testimony proves that there was a bargain purchase option, the parties 
must have agreed that the purported seller enjoyed a right to repurchase 
the transferred receivables at a bargain price. 
This thinking seems to underlie the approach of the Restatement. As 
we have seen, the Restatement includes "the presence of a substantial 
disparity between the value received by the grantor and the fair market 
value of the real estate at the time of the conveyance" among the 
circumstances from which the trier of fact may infer that a deed absolute 
was intended to serve as security. 186 Where, as in illustration 3 of 
Restatement section 3.2, the grantor and grantee offer conflicting 
testimony concerning the terms of the parties' agreement, the fact of a 
substantial disparity may assist the trier of fact in determining whom to 
believe. 187 Thus, in illustration 3, the disparity between the amount 
advanced by Grantee ($25 ,000) and the value ofBlackacre at the time of 
the conveyance ($50,000), together with the fact that Grantor retained 
possession of Blackacre and continued to pay real estate taxes, gives 
credence to Grantor's testimony that Grantee promised to reconvey 
Blackacre upon Grantor ' s payment of $35 ,000. In other words, in 
illustration 3, the determinative fact is Grantor's option to obtain a 
184. See supra Part Ill. B. 
185. See id. 
186. RESTATEM ENT THIRD, P ROPERTY (MO RTGAGES)§ 3.2(b )(2). 
187. See id. 
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reconveyance of Blackacre at a bargain price, not the substantial 
disparity between the value of Blackacre and the amount Grantor 
received for it. 
We return to the broader point: The terms of the transaction dictate its 
characterization. Unless the terms have the effect of providing for the 
transferor to retain an interest in the property transferred (which would 
be the case, for example, if the term include a mechanism by which the 
transferor can compel reconveyance of the property), the transaction is 
not a SISO. In the mortgage context, a person seeking to recharacterize 
a deed absolute as a mortgage is given considerable leeway to prove the 
terms of the transaction. But we doubt that, as an evidentiary matter, the 
disparity between the value of the transferred property and the value 
given to the transferor should be sufficient to prove that a transaction is 
a SISO, particularly in the context of securitization of receivables. The 
large disparity between price and value in Example 5 does suggest that 
the parties may not have entered into a true sale, inasmuch as one must 
wonder whyS would fully divest itself of receivables for only about half 
of their value. But if disparity alone supported recharacterization, the 
terms of the SISO transaction would not be apparent. As we noted in 
connection with illustration 5 to Restatement section 3.2, presumably the 
deemed loan would have been in the amount of the price paid by B to S 
in Example 5, and perhaps it would be due at a "reasonable time" and 
bear a "reasonable" interest rate. 188 In the real world of receivables 
transactions, in which sophisticated parties and well drafted documents 
predominate, it is extremely unlikely that there would occur great 
disparities in price and value in the absence of other terms supporting 
SISO treatment. 189 It follows that the question whether such a disparity 
alone would be sufficient to support recharacterization of a purported 
sale of receivables is not of practical impmtance. 190 
Finally, consider Example 6. 191 
188. See supra note 140. 
189. It is hard to imagine that S would be arguing that the transaction is a SISO unless S offered 
ev id ence that there were other agreed terms to support recharacterization. And, of course, if S does not 
oppose true sale treatment then no dispute would exist. In theory, a creditor or insolvency representati ve 
would raise the recharacterization issue even in the absence of such parol evidence from S, thus square ly 
rais ing the issue of whether the price-value disparity would be sufficient for recharacterization. But 
third parties would not need to rely on recharacterization based on a price-value disparity. The disparity 
would permit them to rely on the law of constructive fraudulent transfer. See, e.g., UN!F. FRAUDULENT 
TRAN SFER ACT § 4(a)(2) (1984) (providing that certain transfers are fraudulent as to a creditor " if the 
debtor made the transfer ... without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the 
trans fer"). 
190 . Of course, as the preceding footnote indicates, such a disparity may be relevant to other legal 
issues implicating the rights of creditors. 
191. Example 6 is based on a hypothetical transaction suggested to us by Kettering. Kettering 
Memorandum, supra note 48, at 6- 7. 
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Example 6: 
S agrees to sell and B agrees to buy specified receivables for a purchase 
price of $1 ,000. The parties expect that the aggregate collections on the 
receivables will be $900. B agrees to pay an up-front purchase price 
equal to the agreed present value (based on the parties' expectations as to 
the timing of future collections) of the $900 anticipated collections. B 
further agrees to pay a deferred purchase price equal to fifty percent of 
collections on the receivables in excess of $900. 
We do not believe that the transaction in Example 6 should be 
recharacterized as a SISO. It is true that following the sale S stands to 
benefit if B recovers more than the $900 that the parties expect to be 
collected and in that respect S retains a future economic stake in the 
future collections of the receivables. The fact that the parties 
characterized this stake as a contingent readjustment of the purchase 
price does not preclude the possibility that, in a proper case, the stake 
could represent an interest retained by S that could support 
recharacterization as a SISO. However, recharacterization would not be 
appropriate in Example 6 for want of an obligation that would be 
secured by the receivables were the transaction to be recharacterized. 
On what obligation could S possibly default in order to trigger B's 
remedies as a secured party? The absence of a secured obligation 
conclusively demonstrates that the transaction is not a SISO. 
On another view, arguably S has not sold one hundred percent of its 
interest in the receivables and has retained an undivided interest 
represented by its contingent right to be paid fifty percent of the 
collections in excess of $900. But because the interest acquired by B is 
not a SISO (for want of a secured obligation), even if S had retained 
such a contingent future interest in the receivables the transaction would 
reflect a true sale to B of the interest in the receivables over and above 
the interest retained by S. 
As a variation on Example 6, assume that B is entitled to recourse 
against S to the extent that B recovers less than $900 from the 
receivables. As we noted in connection with Example 3, such recourse 
does provide S with a stake in the future connections. 192 But also as 
explained in that connection, in the setting of Example 3 we view such 
recourse as a suretyship obligation of S that does not reflect a retained 
interest in the receivables. 193 Should this variation change the 
appropriate result in Example 6? One might argue that S's contingent 
recourse obligation (up to $900) is the obligation secured (as in Example 
1) and that the receivables secure that obligation because S has retained 
an interest in the receivables (represented by the contingent future 
192. See supra Part V.B (Example 3). 
193 . !d. 
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interest in collections in excess of $900). We would reject that analysis, 
however, because S's right to receive payments on its retained future 
interest would ripen only when collections had exceeded $900 and the 
contingent recourse obligation had ceased to exist. That is to say, S's 
recourse obligation cannot ripen if the receivables have value. S's asset 
(the putative collateral) and S's ripened recourse obligation (the putative 
secured obligation) cannot coexist. 
Example 6 illustrates the inherent difficulties of rules that require 
resolution of a dichotomy (lease or SISO, true sale or SISO) based on 
terms of transactions that reflect gradations and matters of degree. 
There will be hard cases whose proper outcome is disputed. This is not 
an exact science. 
This discussion also implicates another, less obvious point. Both 
commentary and case law implicitly take as given that, when a 
purported sale of a receivable does not qualify for true sale treatment of 
the purported seller's entire interest, the transaction must be a SISO. In 
our view, however, that conclusion is not inevitable . To be more 
precise, a transfer that does not constitute a true sale of the transferor's 
entire interest in a receivable nonetheless may also not constitute a SISO 
because, for example, there may be no secured obligation (as in 
Example 6). Although the transferor retains an interest in the relevant 
receivables, the transaction may be a true sale of the portion of the 
seller's interest that it purported to transfer. Consider the sale of an 
undivided fractional interest in a receivable. Cases involving sales of 
participation interests in loans generally have recognized that such a 
fractional interest can be the subject of a true sale even though the seller 
has itself retained a fractional interest. 194 Similarly, one might have a 
true sale of rights to discrete and specific payments of principal and 
interest (e.g., a sale of the right to payment of principal and interest due 
on a specified date). 195 
194. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp . v. Mademoiselle of Cal., 379 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1967). We 
acknowledge that there are important aspects of the law relating to loan parti c ipations that remain 
unsettled. See, e.g.. Steven L. Schwa rcz, Jntennedimy Risk in a Global Economy, 50 DUKE L.J . 154 1, 
1558--60 (200 1 ). The po int to be made for present purposes is that it is possible to have a true sa le of a 
rece ivable as to which the se ller remains the owner of the un sold fractional interest and no SISO is 
created. 
195. We can imagine a transfer of less precise and less identifiable rights and interests resu lting in 
a shared ownershi p in a receivable, but in a transac tion that would not create a SISO for wan t of an 
ident ifiable secured obli gation. While such transactions may be of conceptua l interes t, we are uncertain 
whether they are common. Transactions in which the seller retains a security interest in the transferred 
receivables to sec ure the buyer' s obligations to the seller are more common. Of course, the fact that the 
se ll er retained a security interes t in the receivab les is not at all inconsistent with the buyer becoming the 
owner and the transac tion being a true sale. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In this Article we have advanced a more coherent approach to the 
exercise of distinguishing a true sale of receivables from a SISO. In 
particular, we have drawn on the experience and learning from the 
analogous process of distinguishing a true lease from a SISO. The 
central feature of the lease-SISO dichotomy is whether the purported 
lessor has retained a meaningful residual interest. If it has, then true 
lease characterization, not SISO treatment, is appropriate. In the 
receivables context, the central questions are whether a purported seller 
has retained a meaningful interest in the receivables that are subject to a 
sale to a purported buyer and, if so, whether the interest transferred to 
the purported buyer secures an obligation of the seller. Affinnative 
answers to these questions should result in SISO characterization. The 
existence of a buyer's recourse obligation to a seller may be a significant 
factor inasmuch as SISO characterization requires the existence of a 
secured obligation and a buyer's recourse may satisfy that requirement. 
But such a recourse obligation is not, alone, sufficient to justify 
recharacterizing a sale transaction as a SISO. In our view a functional 
analysis based on the application of economic realities to the terms of a 
transaction offers a more coherent and predictable approach than the 
"factors" approach reflected in much of the case law. That approach has 
long been rejected by case law and codification in the true lease versus 
SISO context, and we believe the same is warranted in the true sale of 
receivables versus SISO analysis. 
